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THE INTERNET AT 20: EVOLUTION OF
A CONSTITUTION FOR CYBERSPACE
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, this Journal published my1 article arguing for broader public access
to government-generated information, explaining that the Internet provided the
potential for a new window into government operations and decisions.2 That article,
summarized more thoroughly in Part I.C below, focused on only one aspect of the
then-neophyte Internet’s capacity to revolutionize how people interact with each
other, participate in democratic political systems, conduct commerce, and create and
communicate art.3
The Internet is now about twenty years old—measured from the time that the
federal government decided to release it from its governmental sponsorship and con-
trol in the research and national security communities and launch it into the private
sector as a global information infrastructure. Some of the earliest battles over the
Internet were fought over access to government information. Gradually, the battle-
field broadened, encompassing a wide range of federal and state constitutional issues,
federal common law, and private international law.
The same core issues and principles explored in my 1995 article, however—
deferring to competitive markets and encouraging them to produce a diversity of
products and services, ensuring access to the marketplace by all consumers and
producers, and providing a mechanism to compensate for injury4—now frame the
full range of legal and policy questions arising from the Internet’s ubiquity.
The combination of technological characteristics defining the Internet, regulatory
philosophies first articulated by the Clinton administration, statutes addressing par-
ticular problems, judicial decisions, and market-driven commercial practices form
* Professor of Law and former Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Member of the
bar: Virginia (inactive), Pennsylvania (inactive), District of Columbia, Maryland, Illinois,
Supreme Court of the United States. SB in Aeronautics and Astronautics, MIT, 1966, SM
in Management, MIT Sloan School of Management, 1970, J.D., Georgetown University
Law Center, 1975.
1 To date, the author has never written an article in the first person. My involvement in
the development of the Internet, however, warrants use of the first person in this Article.
2 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Sources of Rights to Access Public Information, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 179 (1995).
3 See id.
4 Id. at 183–90, 211.
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the Internet’s “constitution.” As with the British Constitution, no overarching con-
stitutional document exists; rather,
[S]afeguards of human rights and freedoms are not the rigid le-
galism and paper guarantees of written constitutions and Bills
of Rights but the benevolent exercise of discretion by public of-
ficials, who are accountable through their political masters to the
legislature and the people, accompanied by the efficiency and
careful scrutiny of the legislative process.5
Further,
[T]here is no single, identifiable document that is widely ac-
cepted as a systematic statement of the basic tenets of British
constitutional law.
But this is not the only possible definition of a “constitu-
tion.” . . . [A] constitution [is] “the whole system of government
of a country, the collection of rules which establish and regulate
or govern the government.”6
The same can be said about the Internet’s constitution. It is not expressed in a
single document. Instead, it comprises the open architecture inherent in the Internet’s
technological protocols together with a collection of government policies, legislative
enactments, and judicial decisions that seek to protect the basic architectural philos-
ophy, ensure space for entrepreneurial freedom, and guard against the abuse of eco-
nomic or political power.
This Article looks back over the Internet’s first twenty years, highlighting the
crucial legal decisions by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches that have
led to the Internet’s success, and that now frame its constitution. I participated in
many of these decisions and wrote more than a dozen law review articles and re-
ports suggesting directions for public policy and law. This Article uses this foun-
dation to consider the future, focusing on major legal controversies, the resolution
of which will define the Internet’s third decade—either strengthening or under-
mining its constitution.
5 Anthony Lester, Fundamental Rights in the United Kingdom: The Law and the British
Constitution, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 337, 340–41 (1976) (describing the engines of the British
Constitution).
6 Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 329, 332 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
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I. DEVELOPING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
During the 1990s and early 2000s, policymakers and entrepreneurs developed
a “constitution” for the Internet that succeeded in balancing a number of overlapping
and conflicting objectives:
• ensuring open access to the physical infrastructure;7
• ensuring that intermediaries flourished and that content originators
had free access to them;
• developing the tools for expansive e-commerce;
• developing rules for transborder jurisdiction so that the burden of
enforcement did not cause intermediaries to shut out controversial
content; and
• managing security, intelligence, and law enforcement goals so that
people were not afraid to use the Internet.8
Intertwined with these objectives was the need for a system to manage Internet
domain names and addresses that would be broadly acceptable around the world.
A. Foundations
Work on developing legal regimes to govern the Internet began in earnest in the
mid-1990s, around the time my article was published in this Journal. By then, the
basic technological and policy foundation for the Internet was reasonably secure.9
Conferences had been held at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government
in 1990, and elsewhere, on unleashing the Internet from its academic and federally
subsidized origins.10 In 1994, the National Research Council published a report on
the potential of what would become the Internet to support communications and in-
formation exchange activities throughout society.11 By 1995, the federal government
had defunded the Internet, and handed its further development to private entities using
the growing array of private networks with growing bandwidth.12
7 The infrastructure access issue initially focused on opening up the Public Switched
Telephone Network (PSTN), and later on assuring net neutrality by a handful of Internet
backbone service providers and content intermediaries.
8 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
9 See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., REALIZING THE INFORMATION
FUTURE: THE INTERNET AND BEYOND (1994).
10 See generally Barry M. Leiner, et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y
(2003), available at http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/internet-51/history-internet/brief
-history-internet.
11 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 9.
12 See Leiner, supra note 10.
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The 1990 Harvard Conference addressed technological, economic, and broad
public policy issues presented by the evolution of the Internet into the private
sector.13 I was one of the few participants who focused on legal issues. My article,
Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to Electronic Networks,14
refined some of the legal ideas I had first addressed in a paper presented at the
conference. Observing that the unbundling of value at the heart of the Internet’s
architecture would result in a greater diversity of products and services, narrowly
focused on particular functions, and able to interconnect seamlessly with functions
performed by products and services offered by others, the article articulated three
goals for the legal framework for the Internet:
1. It should promote a “diversity of information products and services in
a competitive marketplace; [t]his means that suppliers must have rea-
sonable autonomy in designing their products.”15
2. It should protect “users and organizers of information content” from
being “foreclosed from access to markets or audiences;”16 and
3. It must provide compensation for injury suffered from information
content when victims can prove traditional levels of fault, while shield-
ing intermediaries from liability for content posted by others.17
A small group of lawyers met monthly in Washington for a couple of years af-
ter the Harvard Conference: David Johnson, Ron Plesser, Jerry Berman, Robert
Gellman,18 Kent Stuckey, and me.19 We developed ongoing relationships and con-
versations with other critical policy developers: Becky Burr,20 Mitch Kapor,21 Larry
13 See KAHIN: BUILDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (Brian Kahin ed., 1992) (edited
versions of papers presented at the conference).
14 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to Electronic
Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65 (1992).
15 Id. at 71.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Robert Gellman, A Better Way to Approach Privacy Policy in the United States: Establish
a Non-Regulatory Privacy Protection Board, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1183 (2003).
19 Hereinafter the “Washington Group.”
20 J. Beckwith Burr, WILMER HALE, http://www.wilmerhale.com/becky_burr/ (last visited
May 1, 2012). J. Beckwith (“Becky”) Burr, then an attorney-advisor at the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and later a senior Internet policy adviser at the National Telecommu-
nications and Information Administration (NTIA), worked with Magaziner to develop the
Clinton administration’s policy for the Internet and e-commerce. Id. She was the Washington
Group’s main liaison with the Magaziner effort. Id.
21 Biography: Mitchell Kapor, KAPOR.COM, http://www.kapor.com/bio/index.html (last
visited May 1, 2012). Mitch Kapor was the developer of Lotus 1-2-3, the first commercially
useful spreadsheet application. Id. He participated in the Harvard Conference and several
subsequent panel discussions on Internet policy organized by the Washington Group.
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Lessig,22 and Ron Staudt.23 Together, we helped crystallize principles that guided
the broadening public discourse over the Internet.
Meanwhile, Congress was beginning to glimpse the potential. The High-
Performance Computing Act of 199124 recognized the potential for society to ben-
efit from “rapid adoption of open network standards,”25 and “of an information
infrastructure of data bases, services, access mechanisms, and research facilities
available for use through the [Internet].”26 It authorized the establishment of the
National Research and Education Network,27 with the capability of handling data at
one gigabit per second, developed “by purchasing standard commercial transmission
and network services from [private] vendors,”28 and lead to the “establishment of
privately operated high-speed commercial networks.”29
When the Clinton administration took office in January of 1993, it became clear
to those interested in wide-area computer networking that dial-up electronic bulletin
boards, e-mail, and perhaps the Internet were on the threshold of revolutionizing
public access to governmental information.30 Vice President Gore had emerged while
he was still in the Senate as an evangelist for the “Information Superhighway.”31
Technological visionaries were beginning to talk about the possibility of a broader
“electronic commerce” revolution. Ron Plesser, a member of the Washington Group,
recruited me to join the telecommunications section of the Clinton Transition
22 Larry Lessig, Short Biography, LESSIG BLOG, http://www.lessig.org/info/bio (last
visited May 1, 2012). Larry Lessig, then a junior faculty member at the University of
Chicago Law School, initially joined our efforts as a participant in conferences addressing
Internet jurisdiction and governance. Id. He went on to become one of the most prominent
and thoughtful public intellectuals addressing Internet issues, especially copyright law’s
potential to do harm.
23 Faculty Biographies: Ronald W. Staudt, IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLL. OF LAW, http://
www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/rstaudt/ (last visited May 1, 2012). Ron Staudt was a professor of
law at Chicago-Kent College of Law and a pioneer in harnessing information technology to
make legal institutions more effective. Id. As a board member of the National Center for
Automated Information Research (NCAIR), he encouraged NCAIR to fund several confer-
ences organized by the Washington Group.
24 Pub. L. No. 102-194, 105 Stat. 1594 (1991) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501–5543 (1998)).
25 15 U.S.C. § 5502(4) (1998).
26 Id. § 5502(1)(c).
27 Id. § 5512(a).
28 Id. § 5512(c)(8).
29 Id. § 5512(c)(4).
30 See John Podesta, Podesta Details Clinton Administration’s Open-Government
Achievements, FREEDOM FORUM, http://www.freedomforum.org/packages/first/foi
/podesta.htm.
31 See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S12,734 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Gore) (referring to “information superhighway,” on passage of S. 272, High-Performance
Computing and National Research Act).
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Team.32 Although the nominal focus of the section was on the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), Ron and I pushed for language in our transition report address-
ing broader issues of networking.
It was not yet clear, however, what the administration’s philosophy should be re-
garding the regulatory environment for the emerging technologies. The same issues
of access, intermediary liability, security for e-commerce, and standardization existed
whether proprietary networks like Compuserve and America Online dominated the
future or whether they were marginalized by the Internet’s open architecture.
The Office of Management and Budget and the General Services Administration
commissioned me to write a “white paper” on some of the issues, focused on the
ground rules for accessing government information, such as judicial decisions, stat-
utes, and agency rules and regulations in electronic form.33 The issues were easier
here because they did not confront private property ownership in the purely private
sphere. Indeed, a federal statute—the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)34—
already guaranteed access to information in paper formats. The question was how
it should be extended to electronic formats. I had already done some of the early
work on how to resolve this question.35
My article previously published in this Journal framed the problem and possible
solutions:36 “The [a]rticle mobilize[d] the legal arguments entitling members of the
public, including publishers, to access and emphasize[d] the clash of interests when
a government,” tempted by new revenue possibilities, “seeks to sponsor a monopoly
for access to information in electronic formats.”37 It analyzed FOIA and its state
counterparts, which are intended to increase public access,38 and copyright law, which
32 See D. Ian Hopper, Critics Blast Report Supporting Carnivore, ABC NEWS (Nov. 22,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/Story?id=119286&page=1=.TXCcaRXOFBS
#.TxtNDG8V2HN.
33 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., PUBLIC INFORMATION IN THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE, REPORT TO THE REGULATORY INFORMATION SERVICE CENTER, GENERAL
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, AND TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION
AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (1994).
34 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009).
35 See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Determining the Content and Identifying Suppliers of
Public Information in Electronic Form, 17 GOV’T PUB. REV. 325 (1990); Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., Electronic Acquisition and Release of Federal Agency Information: Analysis of
Recommendations Adopted by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 41
ADMIN. L. REV. 253 (1989); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Federal Electronic Information Policy, 63
TEMP. L. REV. 201 (1990); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Christopher J. Lhulier, Information Access
Rights Based on International Human Rights Law, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 899 (1997); Henry
H. Perritt, Jr., Should Local Governments Sell Local Spatial Databases Through State
Monopolies?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 449 (1995); Perritt, supra note 2; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The
Information Highway: On Ramps, Checkpoints, and Tollbooths, 13 GOV’T INFO. Q. 143 (1996).
36 Perritt, supra note 2, at 179.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 186–95.
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gives the “owner” of information the power to prevent access or use.39 It considered
how the First Amendment may come into play by limiting information monopolies,
whether supported by copyright law or just imposed as a matter of public policy and
economic interest of those already possessing the information.40 It evaluated antitrust41
and burdens on interstate commerce42 limitations on information monopolies.
During the same period, I authored ACUS Recommendation 88-10,43 which en-
couraged agencies to apply the FOIA to electronic formats, recommended greater
use of information technology to disseminate agency information, and discouraged
exclusive arrangements for disseminating public information. It supported agency
experimentation with electronic means of providing public participation and rule-
making, adjudication, and other administrative proceedings.44 Subsequently, I drafted
a set of principles for access to federal information in electronic formats eventually
adopted by the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates in August 1991,45
which shaped amendments to FOIA,46 and worked with Ron Plesser as he mediated
an agreement among stakeholders on what became the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995.47 Among other things, the Paperwork Reduction Act prohibited agencies from
“establish[ing] an exclusive, restricted, or other distribution arrangement[s],”48 and
assured private entrepreneurs of access to public information so that they could de-
velop their own value-added products.
While I was working on the white paper,49 Ira Magaziner, in the White House
Office, aided by Becky Burr at the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, undertook the task of developing a broader policy statement.50
Magaziner’s effort took longer than mine because it involved a much broader spec-
trum of interests. It produced two documents: a “Green Paper” on Internet domain
39 Id. at 197–204.
40 Id. at 205–10.
41 Id. at 211–14.
42 Id. at 214–17.
43 Recommendation of the Administrative Conference Regarding Federal Agency Use of
Computers in Acquiring and Releasing Information, 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-10 (1989) [hereinafter
ACUS Recommendation 88-10].
44 Id.
45 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Freedom of Information, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 391,
398 n.61 (1998) (summarizing ABA recommendations).
46 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, 110 Stat. 3048, 3050
§ 5 (1996) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)); see also Perritt, supra note 45, at 395–98
(analyzing EFOIA).
47 Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2002));
see Perritt, supra note 45, at 407–08 (analyzing Paperwork Reduction Act).
48 44 U.S.C. § 3506(d)(4)(A) (2002).
49 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
50 See infra notes 51–52.
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names,51 and a framework for global electronic commerce,52 both of which had
seminal and continuing influence. The framework was analogous to the Federalist
Papers in articulating constitutional principles for the Internet. It committed the
United States government to “widespread competition and increased consumer
choice” as the defining features of the new digital marketplace, “a non-regulatory,
market-oriented approach to electronic commerce,” and discouraged “taxes and
duties, restrictions on the type of information transmitted, control over standards
development, licensing requirements and rate regulation of service providers,” likely
to throttle the Internet in its adolescence.53
From the earliest discussions about moving the Internet from the government-
funded research and education communities to the private marketplace, it was
apparent that new issues related to freedom of expression, access rights, and liability
of intermediaries would arise.54
B. Creative Commons Philosophy55
These early principles developed for access to government information and for
regulation of the Internet drew upon and reinforced the Internet’s unique technolog-
ical architecture. The Internet is fundamentally different from the Public Switched
Telephone Network (PSTN) and from broadcast radio and television networks.56 It
is indifferent to the type of traffic contained in the packets that move across it. The
originating computer takes a full-motion video, an e-mail message, the text of an
article, or a Facebook posting, and breaks it up into packets and sends them into the
Internet.57 Once they get into the Internet, they look like any other packets to all the
51 Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 10, 1998)
(summarizing process for developing the Green Paper). The Green Paper is considered
further in Part II.E.1.
52 See Framework for Global Information Infrastructure, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 1,
1997), http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html.
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Electronic Network Communities,
38 VILL. L. REV. 349 (1993) (evaluating different legal models for assuring access to Internet
resources); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Congress, the Courts and Computer Based Communi-
cations Networks: Answering Questions about Access and Content Control, 38 VILL. L. REV.
319 (1993) (surveying and synthesizing symposium articles on freedom of expression, in-
termediary liability, and access guarantees in Internet-like networks); Perritt, supra note 14
(identifying principal legal issues likely to shape the evolution of the Internet).
55 The term “creative commons” came into use later, and is generally applied to appli-
cations software and content. The term, however, embraces the foundational philosophy of
the Internet.
56 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Technologies of Storytelling: New Models for Movies, 10 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 106, 215 (2010).
57 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., What Is the Internet?, INTERNET JURISDICTION, http://www.kentlaw
.edu/cyberlaw/resources/whatis.html.
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routers. The receiving computer reassembles them into a full-motion video, a mes-
sage, an article or a new Facebook item. This indifference to traffic content reflects
the Internet’s four architectural principles.
1. Different layers of the Internet perform different functions. This embodies
the approach of “OSI stack,” which enables each layer to pass messages to adjacent
layers through a standardized, open architecture that prescribes the formats for such
interlayer communication.58 This layering principle means that the Internet itself is
concerned only with passing standardized packets—Internet Packets (IP)—from one
edge to another. The communications lines and switches—called “routers”—in the
middle of the Internet “cloud”59 are indifferent to the content of the IP packets that
traverse the cloud. This layering or building block approach means that designers of
any one layer can make engineering judgments for that layer without concerning them-
selves with the capacity of adjacent layers to handle their traffic.60 The result is more
specialized innovation and a more competitive market structure than if innovation
at any one layer had to wait until all the other layers involved could be adapted.
2. Closely related to the layering principle is the Internet’s “end-to-end design
principle.”61 Applications such as email processing, compression and decompression
of audio or video files, reassembly of message components into the proper order, take
place in applications outside, rather than inside, the cloud.62 This contrasts sharply with
the design principle of the traditional circuit-switched PSTN, where most of the intel-
ligence is inside the network and the devices beyond the edges of the network are re-
latively “stupid.”63 The end-to-end principle enhances competition because it leaves
it to users and providers operating beyond the edge of the network to decide what ap-
plications they want to use and what innovations they want to make or commission.
3. “[T]he Internet Protocol separates the underlying network from the services
that ride on top of them. IP [i]s . . . an open standard, so that anyone c[an] use it to
create new applications and new networks.”64 Thus, the Internet can be implemented
on almost any kind of underlying communications channel, including dedicated tele-
phone trunk circuits, optical fiber modulation and multiplexing protocols, micro-
wave or other radio. The underlying communications technologies affect the bandwidth
of Internet connectivity obtainable over those protocols, but otherwise the users of the
58 Perritt, supra note 56, at 214–15.
59 “The Internet is frequently represented in network diagrams as a cloud, signifying that
users communicating through the Internet do not need to be concerned what is inside the
cloud.”Id. at 214 n.467.
60 Id.
61 See Perritt, supra note 56, at 215; Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis,
85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1164–65 n.2 (1999).
62 Perritt, supra note 56.
63 Id. at 215.
64 Reconsidering Our Communications Laws: Ensuring Competition and Innovation:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (2006) (statement
of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google Inc.).
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Internet do not need to be concerned about how the bits are actually transmitted and
received through wires, optical fibers, or space.
4. The overarching rationale, a result of honoring the first three, is that no cen-
tral gatekeeper controls the Internet. This governing principle allows for creativity
to occur at the network edges. In such an environment, entrepreneurs with new ideas
for applications do not need permission for their inventions to reach end users. Closed
networks, like cable video systems, are different. There, network owners control what
consumers can see and do.65
C. Ensuring Access
The need to ensure the integration of all of the Internet’s separate parts was ap-
parent early in the Internet’s emergence.66 To do this, anyone who wanted to contrib-
ute to the communications and information infrastructure represented by the Internet
must have access. Common carrier regulation was the traditional means for the law
to guarantee access to communications and transportation infrastructures, but com-
mon carrier regulation was not consistent with decentralization and privatization.67
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 moved public policy fundamentally away
from a centralized regulated monopoly approach toward a competitive one more
reliant on market forces.68 Central to its philosophy was ensuring access to the in-
frastructure. The Act was premised on the now-quaint vision that the future would
be dominated by video entertainment transmitted by telephone companies and telec-
ommunications service provided by cable companies.69 The word “Internet” appears
only four times in the statute,70 outside special provisions dealing with protecting
children from harmful information on the Internet. At the same time, however, it
fundamentally altered the industry structure by opening up competition in the
65 Id. at 2–3.
66 See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the National Information Infrastructure,
30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51 (1995) (analyzing traditional legal mechanisms for assuring
access to communications infrastructures and recommending a minimalist approach for law,
focused on interfaces).
67 See id. at 67.
68 See Nicholas Economides, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Its Impact, 11
JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 455, 456–57 (1999).
69 H.R. REP. NO. 104-204(i) at *53 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 16–17
(“Telephone company entry into the delivery of video services will encourage telephone
companies to modernize their communications infrastructure. Specifically, the deployment
of broadband networks would be accelerated if telephone companies were permitted to offer
video programming. These networks would be capable of transmitting voice, data, and video
to consumers.”).
70 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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PSTN.71 It also instructed the FCC to take action to provide incentives to deploy
advanced broadband technologies.72 Pitched battles ensued before the Commission
and in the courts over how competition should be assured under the Act.73
The 1996 legislation expresses a preference for facilities-based competition.74
A facilities-based competitor has its own physical infrastructure.75 But, to achieve
a completely facilities-based market structure, new entrants would have to overcome
enormous economic and legal barriers to entry. They would have to build their own
local loops, dig up the streets to bury their wires or optical fiber, put up their own
poles to carry above-ground wire and fiber, and deploy their own switching centers.
The core legal strategy embedded in the 1996 Act was to use its interconnection,
unbundling, and resale obligations as a way of giving new entrants a foothold until
they could build out their own physical infrastructure.76 Incentives for incumbents
also were important. If incumbents could receive revenue for sharing their existing
facilities with new entrants, they might have less incentive to deploy new technolo-
gies that would reduce costs and open up revenue opportunities from new product
lines. The FCC dealt with this possible adverse incentive by basing allowable charges
for new entrants on forward-looking, rather than historical, costs.77 The incumbent
could not recover costs based on the cost of its embedded technologies, but on the
costs of the most efficient technology in the marketplace—costs that were falling
rapidly.78 That reduced total revenue achievable by maintaining existing assets and
provided an incentive to the incumbent to upgrade.79
71 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (1999) (requiring interconnection and unbundling of network
elements); id. § 259 (requiring established providers to share infrastructure with new en-
trants); id. § 271 (blocking Bell operating companies from entering the long distance market
until they ensured competition in their local exchange markets).
72 See id. § 1302 (2008); see also Ad Hoc Telecomm. Users Comm. v. FCC, 572 F.3d
903, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (characterizing Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.
§ 1302).
73 See generally HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 7 (rev. ed.
2010) (analyzing details of FCC decisions and court decisions under the 1996 Act).
74 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-204(i) (explaining the need for the resale obligation to permit
emergence of facilities-based competition).
75 Id.
76 See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
56 (1996).
77 Id.; 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (2012).
78 See id.
79 See Time Warner Cable, 15 FCC Rcd. 1124, 1134 (Jan. 5, 2000) (explaining that
incumbent cable television providers are not entitled to access open video systems in their
market area “in order to preserve the incentive of such cable operators to upgrade and
maintain their franchised systems and to promote facilities-based competition. If such an
operator were permitted to become a programming provider on an open video system serving
its franchise areas, it would have less incentive to invest in its own facilities and strengthen
its position as a facilities-based competitor in these areas.” (footnote omitted)).
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Three years after the enactment of the 1996 Act, some of the key controversies
reached the Supreme Court in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.80 The Court ap-
proved most aspects of the FCC’s approach, and directed that the Commission give
more attention to the criteria for unbundling and sharing specific network elements.81
2. “Digital Tornado”
Shortly after enactment of the 1996 Act, on March 27, 1997, the FCC released
a staff paper entitled Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy,
authored by Kevin Werbach, analyzing the FCC policy alternatives for the Internet.82
A central theme running through the paper was that the FCC, and other government
agencies, should seek to limit regulation of Internet services.83 In framing his approach,
Werbach stated:
Because it is not tied to traditional models or regulatory environ-
ments, the Internet holds the potential to dramatically change the
communications landscape. The Internet creates new forms of
competition, valuable services for end users, and benefits to the
economy. Government policy approaches toward the Internet
should therefore start from two basic principles: avoid unneces-
sary regulation, and question the applicability of traditional rules.84
3. Making the “Pipe” Bigger
Once the basic decision was made to privatize and commercialize the Internet,
and once the PSTN was opened up, key technological developments increased the mo-
mentum through the 1990s and 2000s. The first barrier to fall allowed access speeds
to increase.85 When the Internet was unleashed in the early 1990s, access was pos-
sible through dedicated lines leased from the telephone company or through dial-up
80 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
81 Id. at 387–92.
82 Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy (FCC
Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 29, 1997), available at http://www.fcc.gov
/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp29.pdf.
83 Id.
84 Id. at ii.
85 Use of the word “speed” is potentially misleading. All electronic signals move more
or less at the speed of light—186,000 miles per second. The rate at which data can be
handled, however, depends on bandwidth. An ordinary telephone voice circuit provides about
4 KHz of bandwidth, limiting data rates to 56 Kbps with advanced modulation techniques.
See MARGARET LEVINE YOUNG, INTERNET: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE 10 (2d ed. 2002).
“Speed,” as used in this text, refers to the speed of data transmission.
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modems connected to ordinary voice telephone lines.86 By the early 2000s, penetration
of cable television infrastructure, the development of cable modems, and the modi-
fication of cable networks to handle traffic in both directions, revolutionized band-
width available at the edges of the network.
Somewhat later, new technologies deployed by the telephone companies, prin-
cipally Digital Subscriber Lines (DSLs), allowed data rates on retail telephone lines
to increase commensurately.87 By the end of the twentieth century, major telephone
service providers, having mainly crushed the threat of competitive local exchange
carriers (CLECs),88 committed substantial capital to improve their networks89 by
deploying optical fiber beyond central offices,90 often directly to residences and
commercial premises, and marketing DSL service to all of their customers.
One of the impediments to widespread use of the Internet was the need to know
the domain name (URL) of a desired destination. Search engines evolved as a kind
of automated index to URLs. One of the most successful early search engines was
AltaVista, developed by Digital Equipment Corporation and introduced in 1995.91
By the beginning of 1999, Google began to emerge as a search engine with a better
search algorithm,92 and by the mid-2000s it dominated the search engine industry.93
86 Typical bandwidth was 1.4 to 1.5 Mbps on a leased T1 line or 56 Kbps through a dial-up
modem. Id. at 13.
87 DSL, developed at Bellcore in the mid-1980s, demonstrated the feasibility of insert-
ing broadband digital signals on the wires designed for baseband analog voice signals. See
Gareth Marples, The History of DSL Internet Access—A Race for Technological Speed,
THEHISTORYOF.NET (Sept. 11, 2008), http://thehistoryof.net/history-of-dsl.html.
88 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 allowed competitive local exchange carriers to
compete with incumbent local exchange carriers by allowing CLECs to use their infra-
structure. CLEC, WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/CLEC.html (last visited
May 1, 2012).
89 Widespread availability of DSL required telephone companies to remove loading coils
from the part of the network that connected central offices to residential and commercial
customers. Loading coils extend the reach of voice signals by reducing the capacitance of
longer lines. See Load Coils?, DSLREPORTS.COM, http://www.dslreports.com/faq/657 (last
visited May 1, 2012). Capacitance is an undesirable feature of a communications channel
because it smooths out the oscillations in an analog signal. See id. Loading coils, however,
also block higher frequency signals, making DSL data transmission impossible.
90 Widespread deployment of an optical fiber infrastructure has made it possible for the
Internet to accommodate exploding demand for higher bandwidth. Signals transmitted over
optical fiber experience much less attenuation and interference than the same signals trans-
mitted over copper (or other metallic) wire. An optical fiber offers orders of magnitude,
higher bandwidths, and longer link distances than copper wire.
91 AltaVista: A Brief History of the AltaVista Search Engine, WEBSEARCHWORKSHOP,
http://www.websearchworkshop.co.uk/altavista_history.php (last visited May 1, 2012).
92 Google History, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/corporate/company/history
.html (last visited May 1, 2012).
93 Google: A Brief History of the Google Search Engine, WEBSEARCHWORKSHOP, http://
www.websearchworkshop.co.uk/google_history.php (last visited May 1, 2012).
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Compression algorithms facilitated distribution of music and videos. Internet
distribution of music exploded with the development of the MP3 compression algo-
rithm and associated hardware and software known as codecs.94 The introduction of
mpeg-4 in 1998 similarly facilitated Internet distribution of full-motion video files.95
Load sharing was widespread by 2000, enhancing the capacity of popular web-
sites.96 As e-commerce exploded, the traffic to popular websites was more than a
single server could handle.97 A protocol was needed that could share the burden
among multiple servers controlled by the same entity and providing essentially the
same information.98 The result was “load sharing,” which “balance[s] the load across
a bunch of physical servers . . . mak[ing] those servers look like one great big server
to the outside world.”99
Wireless data communications at speeds similar to those employed in wired
computer networks have permitted the Internet to expand beyond the infrastructure
defined by physical wires.100 One can access the Internet now—at least in areas of
fairly dense population—from anywhere.
Development and deployment of wireless data systems that could handle data
at speeds useful to computer networks awaited assignment of higher-frequency radio
spectrum and hardware that could operate at those higher frequencies.101 In 1985,
94 Mary Bellis, The History of MP3, ABOUT.COM (2012), http://inventors.about.com/od
/mstartinventions/a/MPThree.htm.
95 Both standards involve patented technology that is licensed by MPEG LA, LLC.
MPEGLA, http://www.mpegla.com/main/default.aspx (last visited May 1, 2012); see id.
96 Load balancing was a feature of Microsoft Windows NT, introduced in 1993. A History
of Windows, MICROSOFT.COM, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/history (last
visited May 1, 2012). Cisco introduced a more sophisticated load-balancing product in 1996,
promoted as a replacement for the Domain Name Service (DNS) round robin strategy. CISCO
SYS., Load Balancing 1 (1998), available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/pd/cxsr
/400/tech/lobal_wp.pdf.
97 KJ (Ken) Salchow, Jr., Load Balancing 101: The Evolution to Application Delivery
Controllers 1 (2007), available at http://www.f5.com/ppc/downloads/load-balancing101
-evolution-adc.pdf.
98 Id.
99 Id. Early efforts involved having a DNS serving the URL of the service provide
different IP addresses in rotation, as queries were received. Id. at 1–2. Later developments
involved having a cluster of servers listen to one IP address through a border router, which
then redirected queries to various servers behind the firewall with locally assigned IP
addresses. Id. at 3. Later, “application delivery controllers” were developed, which resided
outside application servers. They presented virtual server addresses to the outside world and
then forwarded connections to the most appropriate real server. Id. at 4.
100 See, YOUNG, supra note 85, at 15.
101 Theoretical principles of radio engineering dictate that the bandwidth of a signal in-
creases as the data rate being transmitted increases. The higher bandwidth necessary for
higher data rates could not be accommodated at lower frequencies which were already
crowded with broadcast radio and television, military and public safety, and other com-
mercial communications.
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the FCC first authorized the use of unlicensed102 spread spectrum103 transmitters in
the 902–928 MHZ, 2400–2483.5 MHZ, and 5725–5850 MHZ bands.104 The result
was an explosion of wireless local area networks (LANs) under protocols popularly
known as Wi-Fi.105
Third (3G) and fourth generation (4G) wireless technologies, generally associ-
ated with smart phones, enable high-bandwidth wireless connections for a variety of
portable devices, including smartphones, tablets such as the iPad, and netbook and
laptop computers.106 These technologies became commercially available in 2001107
and 2010, respectively.108 Expanding broadband wireless access was an important
goal of the congressionally mandated National Broadband Plan,109 published by the
FCC in 2010.110
The ubiquity of high-bandwidth wireless data connections means that one can be
connected to the Internet all the time. Constant connectivity has two major implications.
First, it dramatically increases demand for Internet-accessible products and services.
Audiences can listen to music almost constantly, watch movies or other video enter-
tainment at odd moments of leisure while they wait for appointments or ride the bus
or train, and order books or other consumer products impulsively, as soon as they
102 Before that, every transmitter required a station license.
103 The FCC explained spread spectrum modulation: “Spread spectrum communication
systems use special modulation techniques that spread the energy of the signal being trans-
mitted over a very wide bandwidth. The information to be conveyed is modulated onto a
carrier by some conventional techniques, usually a digital modulation technique, and the band-
width of the signal is deliberately widened by means of a spreading function. The spreading
technique used in the transmitter is duplicated in the receiver to enable detection and de-
coding of the signal. Spread spectrum systems offer two important technological advantages
over conventional transmission schemes. First, the spreading reduces the power density of
the signal at any given frequency within the transmitted bandwidth, thereby reducing the
probability of causing interference to other signals occupying the same spectrum. Second,
the signal processing in spread spectrum systems tends to suppress undesired signals, thereby
enabling such systems to tolerate strong interfering signals.” FCC SPECTRUM POLICY TASK
FORCE, REPORT OF THE UNLICENSED DEVICES AND EXPERIMENTAL LICENSES WORKING
GROUP 8 n.13 (2002), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/sptf/files/E&UWGFinalReport.pdf
[hereinafter FCC UNLICENSED DEVICES REPORT].
104 Id. at 8.
105 Id. at 6.
106 3G and 4G Wireless, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/topic/3g-4g-wireless (last visited May 1,
2012).
107 See Danielle Dunne, What is ‘3G’ Technology?, CNN.COM (Oct. 22, 2001), http://
europe.cnn.com/2001/TECH/industry/10/22/3g.defined.idg/index.html.
108 Kristena Hansen, 4G Wireless Technology: A Look at What’s Ahead, L.A. TIMES (June 13,
2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/13/business/la-fi-4g-20100614.
109 47 U.S.C. § 1305 (2005) (authorizing the establishment of a national broadband service
development and expansion program).
110 FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN (2010), available at
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf.
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hear favorable reports from a friend or on the radio or television. This phenomenon
means that industry structures built around segmentation of delivery channels—such
as movie theaters, television, and DVDs in the video entertainment industry—must
now recalibrate their business models to accommodate a marketplace where the old
product categories are irrelevant.
Second, ease of use becomes even more important when one is browsing the
Internet, checking out friends on Facebook, playing a song, watching a movie, or
ordering merchandise on a small handheld device instead of a desktop or laptop
computer. This means that consumers will gravitate to one-stop, integrated services,
such as Amazon and Facebook, instead of going to the trouble of checking out dif-
ferent websites. This is likely to intensify the preference for cyberspace “empires,”
considered in Part II.A.
4. Convergence of Cable Modem and Telephone Regulation
The FCC gradually merged aspects of cable and telephone regulation as it
applied to the Internet, initially deregulating DSL, and more recently recognizing
that some regulation may be necessary to assure net neutrality, as considered in
Part II.B.
In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,111
the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s determination that broadband Internet service
provided by cable companies does not constitute a “telecommunications service”
under Title II of the Communications Act.112 Accordingly, such service is not subject
to mandatory common carrier regulation. Shortly after deregulating cable modem
service, the FCC announced a decision to treat broadband Internet access provided
by Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) like cable modem Internet access,113
placing telephone company offerings of broadband service outside all the traditional
telephone company regulatory requirements—common-carriage, unbundling, resale,
tariffing, price regulation, and inter-carrier compensation.114
Robust competition for Internet access services is emerging and will accelerate,
the Commission concluded, encompassing not only the present market leaders, cable
modem service and DSL service, but increasingly satellite-based and fixed broad-
band wireless,115 and access through the electricity grid.
111 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
112 Id. at 996–97.
113 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities
et al., 20 FCC Rcd. 14853 (2005).
114 Exemption of the broadband pipe provided by the telephone companies does not,
however, mean that the services they provide that run through the pipe are exempt. Consider
the FCC’s treatment of voice over IP Providers (VoIP). See id. ¶ 54, at 14964.
115 Id. ¶ 59, at 14885.
2012] THE INTERNET AT 20 1131
D. Domain Name Regulation
Domain name administration is central to regulation of the Internet.116 One
can have an Internet presence such as a website only if one has a domain name.117
Refusal to register a domain name or revocation of an existing domain name
excludes the applicant or holder from the Internet. Accordingly, whoever regulates
domain names has fundamental regulatory control over the Internet.
Certain characteristics of the Internet make regulation of addresses and domain
names necessary. The Internet’s common name and address space means that each
domain name and numerical Internet address must be unique. Otherwise, routers
could not route packets unambiguously to the correct destination.
Soon after taking office, the Clinton administration undertook the task of
deciding how domain name regulation should work in a decentralized, privatized
Internet.118 The process continued until well into the President’s second term, and
resulted in the Green Paper,119 which announced that the United States government
would recognize a new not-for-profit corporation that would take over administration
of the domain name system.120 The result was the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN).121
116 The system for assigning domain names and for managing the top levels of the
hierarchical DNS are described in RFC 1591. J. Postel, Domain Name System Structure and
Delegation, Request for Comments: 1591 (Mar. 1994), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc
/rfc1591.txt.
117 That is not strictly true. Internet packets are routed based on numerical IP addresses.
One could theoretically maintain an Internet presence with an IP address and without a do-
main name, but users seeking the holder of the IP address would have to know the numerical
address. Moreover, assignment of IP addresses is integrated with assignment of domain
names. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,742 (June 10,
1998) (explaining the relationship between assigning IP addresses and assignment of domain
names) [hereinafter White Paper].
118 See Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8826, 8827 (Feb. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Green Paper].
119 See White Paper, supra note 117, at 31,741 (summarizing process for developing the
Green Paper). The Green Paper actually was a proposal with a request for comments. See
Green Paper, supra note 118, at 8827. The policy statement emerged from the comment
process. White Paper, supra note 117, at 31,741 (explaining the Green Paper). Nevertheless,
the final policy statement is popularly known as the Green Paper, as well.
120 White Paper, supra note 117, at 31,749.
121 Under solicitation number 52SBNT9C1020, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology solicited a sole source contract from ICANN. The United States government and
ICANN entered into a memorandum of understanding that provided ground rules for
ICANN. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 521 (2d ed.
2001). The relationship among ICANN, registries, and registrars is summarized in Dotster,
Inc. v. ICANN, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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ICANN adopted the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy,122
imposing on all registrants of domain names an obligation to submit to private
dispute resolution under ICANN rules.123 ICANN also adopted rules for domain
name dispute resolution.124 The rules provide uniform standards for complaints,
private resolution panels, and power of panels.125 A number of organizations, in-
cluding the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), established dispute
resolution mechanisms to comply with the ICANN rules.126 The WIPO panels have
resolved several thousand disputes, although WIPO’s Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy has been subjected to sharp criticism.127 I am a member of the panel for WIPO
dispute resolution.128
Though the ICANN dispute resolution system is limited to disputes alleging that
domain names interfere with trademarks, a broader power exists as well.129 Registries
are obligated by standard ICANN terms to terminate domain names when the holder
engages in “abuse.”130 In October 2008, the ICANN staff issued a report on registra-
tion abuse policies, critical of the lack of uniform policies in applying the abuse
standard.131 Nevertheless, the abuse policies are potentially available to use domain
names as leverage to enforce a broader set of legal duties. Enforcing an international
or foreign adjudicatory decision against Internet domain names can be an effective
supplement to traditional judgment execution against tangible property. The domain
registry would be the “sheriff,” acting on a “writ of execution.”132 As the ICANN Staff
Report indicated, more uniform policies are needed to make clear what “judgments”
are entitled to enforcement and what process is due before a domain name is revoked.133
122 See Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en
/udrp/ (last visited May 1, 2012).
123 Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN (Oct. 24, 1999), available
at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm.
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, supra note 122.
126 See Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service for Generic Top-Level Domains,
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/gtld/ (last visited
May 1, 2012).
127 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 96–101 (2000).
128 WIPO Domain Name Panelists, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo
.int/amc/en/domains/panel/panelists.html (last visited May 1, 2012).
129 See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 123.
130 MARIKA KONINGS, GNSO ISSUES REPORT ON REGISTRATION ABUSE POLICIES 11 (2008),
available at http://gnso.icann.org/issues/registration-abuse/gnso-issues-report-registration
-abuse-policies-29Oct08.pdf [hereinafter ABUSE REPORT].
131 Id. at 5.
132 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Will the Judgment-Proof Own Cyberspace?, 32 INT’L LAW. 1121,
1148 (1998).
133 ABUSE REPORT, supra note 130, at 45; see also Perritt, supra note 132, at 1178.
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E. Immunity for Intermediaries
Tort liability for intermediaries might impede broad access. On the other hand,
intermediaries are attractive targets to satisfy the transborder jurisdiction problem,
as considered in Part I.F. This tension concerned the Washington Group. We brain-
stormed about two directions for legal intervention: recognizing an immunity for in-
termediaries, and establishment of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to
address most claims of harm resulting from Internet-based content.134 The immunity
we considered was codified in section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,135
for everything except intellectual property, and in the safe harbor provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).136
Alternative dispute resolution would reduce intermediary concerns about liabil-
ity because it could lessen the uncertainty and costs of litigation in the regular courts,
and could limit remedies to removal of the accused content. Even if such systems did
not preempt traditional judicial processes and remedies—which would be difficult
to do without an international treaty—it would divert many controversies into the al-
ternative system. The alternative dispute resolution ideas were partially codified in
the Domain Name Dispute Resolution system mandated as a requirement for Domain
Name registrars,137 and in the procedural provisions of the DMCA safe harbor.138
F. Jurisdiction
Figuring out how the Internet should be regulated involved figuring out how
prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction139 should work.140 Legal jurisdiction is
134 See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.
135 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230
(2006)).
136 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(a), 112 Stat. 2877
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006)). The Safe Harbor Provisions of the
DCMA were brokered to a significant degree by Washington Group member Ron Plesser,
who had chaired the telecommunications section of President Clinton’s Transition Team.
137 See supra Part I.D.
138 To qualify for the immunity, a service provider must remove material when it receives
notice directed to its designated agent claiming that the material infringes a copyright. The
notice must meet requirements defined in the statute. The originator of removed material is
entitled to notice and to have the material put back up unless the person claiming copyright
infringement files suit for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2)–(3), (g)(2)(C).
139 Known as “personal jurisdiction” in the United States. See Michael D. Ramsey,
International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 271, 296 (2009).
140 Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the power to make rules. Adjudicatory jurisdiction refers
to the power to adjudicate alleged rule violations. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a
Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. &
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fundamentally local, aligned with the boundaries of sovereign power; the Internet
is inherently global, crossing sovereign boundaries.
A number of early cases, some involving pre-Internet technologies such as dial-
up bulletin boards, crystallized concerns that traditional doctrines of adjudicative
jurisdiction might be unsuitable for the Internet.141 The early case law was synthe-
sized by the district court in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,142
which articulated a “sliding scale,” relied on in many subsequent personal juris-
diction cases.143 Zippo held that passive websites should not be subject to jurisdic-
tion merely because they were visible in the forum state, but that contracts involving
knowing and repeated transmission of files to and from the forum state would
support jurisdiction.144 In between these two extremes, jurisdiction should depend
on the degree of interactivity built into the website.145
I wrote two law review articles in the mid-1990s summarizing the state of the
debate.146 At first, it was difficult to get the American Bar Association and others
interested in the question. The prevailing view among lawyers was that the Internet
was a toy and would never become a significant channel for professional interaction
or commerce. Nevertheless, some of us in the bar, the industry, and the academic
and policy communities argued about how to adapt traditional jurisdiction concepts
to the realities of the Internet.147
The two poles in the debate were framed by David Johnson (a member of the
Washington Group) and David Post, on the one hand, and Jack Goldsmith, on the
other.148 In 1997, as I was moving from the faculty of Villanova University School
of Law to become the Dean at Chicago-Kent College, I organized a law review
MARY L. REV. 711, 785 (2009) (distinguishing between prescriptive and adjudicatory
jurisdiction); Ramsey, supra note 139, at 295–96 (same).
141 Compare CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264–66 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding personal jurisdiction in Ohio over a Texas resident who purposefully directed busi-
ness activities toward Ohio by knowingly entering into a contract with CompuServe, an Ohio
resident, and then “deliberately” and “repeatedly” transmitting files to Ohio), and Inset Sys.,
Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding personal jurisdiction
because advertising on the Internet constituted purposeful doing of business in Connecticut
because “unlike television and radio advertising, the advertisement is available continuously
to any Internet user”), with Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction based on passive website alone and distinguishing
CompuServe).
142 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
143 Id. at 1124.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Will the Judgment-Proof Own Cyberspace?, 32 INT’L LAW. 1121 (1998).
147 Perritt, Jurisdiction in Cyberpsace, supra note 146, at 4.
148 See infra notes 149–51 and accompanying text.
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symposium including Johnson and Goldsmith to explore the debate among several
of us about Internet jurisdiction.149
Post and Johnson argued that, “[C]yberspace—is creating a realm of human
interaction in which . . . physical location and physical space are becoming both
indeterminate and functionally irrelevant.”150 “Cyberspace . . . needs and can create
its own law and legal institutions.”151 Jack Goldsmith argued that cyberspace is not
“hermetically separated from the ‘real’ world.”152 “The easiest way to control illegal
cross-border information flows is to enforce the regulation against the local assets
of the foreign supplier of the information.”153
The Computer Science and Telecommunications Board of the National Academy
of Sciences convened a committee on “Global Networks and Local Values” in the
late 1990s to consider these questions.154 The committee’s report155 stopped short of
making policy recommendations, but observed that “extraterritorial enforcement of
national laws is possible in principle, [but] this generally presupposes that the nation-
state can exercise jurisdiction over some element of the transnational activity—e.g., by
seizing local property or by restricting access to its market.”156
At the turn of the century, the Hague Conference on Private International Law
undertook an effort to negotiate an international convention on adjudicatory juris-
diction and transnational enforcement of judgments in the international e-commerce
context.157 Expert groups convened by the Conference158 considered the idea of
149 See Symposium, Symposium on the Internet and Legal Theory, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
941 (1998).
150 David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Towards
a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1055, 1057–58 (1998).
151 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
152 Jack Goldsmith, Regulation of the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1119, 1119 (1998).
153 Id. at 1125.
154 Global Networks and Local Values, COMPUTER SCI. & TELECOMM. BD., http://sites
.nationalacademies.org/CSTB/CompletedProjects/CSTB_042333. I served as a member of
the committee. Faculty Biographies: Henry H. Perritt Jr., IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF
LAW (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/hperritt/.
155 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBAL NETWORKS AND LOCAL
VALUES: A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (2001), available
at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10033.html.
156 Id. at 192.
157 Press Release, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Geneva Round Table on
Electronic Commerce and Private International Law (Sept. 2, 2001), available at http://www
.hcch.net/upload/wop/press01e.html. I was an active participant in the resulting activities. See id.
158 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Electronic Commerce and the
Internet (Press Release Including Conclusions and Recommendations) (Sept. 2, 1999), http://
www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=1999&varevent=63 (announcing round
table of experts in Geneva); HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, ELECTRONIC
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“targeting” as a principle for localizing Internet activity: targeting consumers in a par-
ticular country would support jurisdiction; unsophisticated sites not engaging in tar-
geting would not be subject to jurisdiction elsewhere based on the website alone.159
Early in the activities of the Conference, I encouraged the State Department
representative to reach out to stakeholders and get them involved—there would be
little point in developing a draft convention only to have significant political in-
terests in the United States torpedo it. Representatives of the entertainment industry
(led by Disney) and representatives of the Internet industry were split.160 The en-
tertainment industry favored expansive jurisdictional rules because they wanted to
be able to sue alleged copyright infringers in United States courts.161 The Internet
industry, particularly internet service providers (ISPs), wanted restrictive jurisdic-
tional rules because they wanted to insulate themselves from litigation in foreign
forums.162 The French Yahoo! case was on everyone’s mind.163 Because of the con-
flict between the two most important stakeholders, the United States government
was unable to take a position on the more important issues at the center of the effort.
This frustrated and annoyed the non-U.S. participants, and the result was essentially
to abandon the effort to craft an international convention.164
The Zippo formula, while incomplete, provided the key for the convergence on
a set of principles generally followed now in hundreds of cases.165 In them, the
COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION (Catherine Kessedjian, ed., 2000), available
at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd12.pdf [hereinafter OTTAWA REPORT].
159 Ottawa Report, supra note 158, at 7.
160 See generally Mary Shannon Martin, Keep it Online: The Hague Convention and the
Need for Online Alternative Dispute Resolution in International Business-to-Consumer E-
Commerce, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J. 125, 136–41 (2002) (discussing different views in relation to
the convention).
161 See Ronald A. Brand, Intellectual Property, Electronic Commerce and the Preliminary
Draft Hague Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 581, 594–97
(2001) (discussing intellectual property rights in the context of the Convention).
162 See id. at 597–98 (discussing concerns related to electronic commerce).
163 In the Yahoo! case, a French court ordered Yahoo! to block access to materials on
Nazism that violated French law. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that the district court lacked personal
jurisdiction; summarizing procedural history). Yahoo! unsuccessfully argued that “there was
no technical solution which would enable it to comply fully with the terms of the court
order.” Id. at 1203. The United States litigation was an attempt by Yahoo! to block en-
forcement of the French judgment in the United States.
164 See Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction
and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference
Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 191, 193 (2001) (discussing lack of consensus
among participants).
165 See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir.
2002) (adopting the Zippo model to find personal jurisdiction); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC,
190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (using the reasoning of Zippo to find personal jurisdiction
over the defendant); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997)
(adopting the Zippo formula).
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Goldsmith view has largely prevailed: the customary requirement for “minimum
contacts” and “fair play and substantial justice” have proved workable for the vast
majority of Internet cases.166 Pressure for new jurisdictional concepts or for an
international treaty has largely evaporated.
Nevertheless, the focus on enforcing judgments against local assets puts pres-
sure on immunity for intermediaries167 because intermediaries usually have local
assets and they represent deep pockets.
G. Electronic Commerce
1. In General
Realization of the Internet’s potential to transform private markets required the
proliferation of e-commerce. E-commerce had existed since the 1960s through ded-
icated communication circuits and by means of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
standards that permitted disparate proprietary computer systems to make sense of the
data sent and received.168 Electronic funds transfer, ATM machines, and point-of-sale
credit card terminals were widely accepted by the end of the 1980s.169 The spread
of the Internet made an easy-to-use interface available in the form of web browsers,
and simplified the processes of establishing computer-to-computer connections.
1995 was a pivotal year. Jeff Bezos launched Amazon.com,170 and Dell and
Cisco both began to use the Internet to interact directly with customers.171 By mid-
2011, few types of consumer goods were not sold online. E-commerce flourished on
166 See CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding spe-
cific jurisdiction but not general jurisdiction in dispute between two Internet-based college
course catalog providers). Compare id. at 1075 (finding Internet connections from California
insufficient to meet demanding standard of “continuous and systematic” for general jurisdic-
tion), with id. 1078–79 (concluding that specific jurisdiction was satisfied because defendant
expressly aimed its downloading requests to California and the dispute related to those contacts).
167 See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
168 See C.J. Anumba & K. Ruikar, Electronic Commerce in Construction-Trends and
Prospects, 11 AUTOMATION CONSTRUCTION 265, 267 (2002) (noting the impact of EDI);
Janine S. Hiller & Don Lloyd Cook, From Clipper Ships to Clipper Chips: The Evolution of
Payment Systems for Electronic Commerce, 17 J.L. & COM. 53, 55 (1997) (noting that the
evolution of the internet begain in the 1960s).
169 Anumba & Ruikar, supra note 168, at 268.
170 Amazon enjoyed explosive growth. Sales revenue grew 838% from 1996 to 1997, and
customer accounts grew 738% in the same period. Letter from Jeffrey P. Bezos, Founder and
Chief Executive Officer, Amazon.com to Shareholders (1997), available at http://media
.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/97/97664/reports/Shareholderletter97.pdf. The impact on
perceptions of e-commerce was almost as dramatic. If so many people were willing to buy
books through the web, they might be willing to buy other things.
171 See Press Release, Cisco, Cisco Systems Broadens Internet Access to the Desktop,
Acquires Internet Junction, Inc. (Sept. 6, 1995), available at http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls
/1995/corp_090695.html.
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the Internet despite early concerns about payment systems, lack of consumer trust,
consumer reluctance to incur transaction costs of using the web, and reluctance of
service or product suppliers to risk their intellectual property.172 Most of these con-
cerns proved unwarranted. In the mid-1990s, many argued that e-commerce would
require the development of entirely new payment systems.173 I disagreed. In two law
review articles written in the late 1990s,174 I argued that the existing credit card sys-
tems would prove perfectly adequate and acceptable to consumers. By 2000, it was
clear that this was the case,175 largely because of the dispute resolution system built
in to credit card transactions.176
Concerns about inconvenience were mitigated by one-click shopping, popular-
ized by Amazon, beginning in 1999.177 The one-click method reduced the number
of steps a consumer must take to order an item from an e-commerce site, and re-
lieved a consumer from having to reenter all of his basic information, such as name,
address, and credit card information.178
On the other hand, the easy replication of information in digital form under-
mined traditional business models in some industries, particularly those for music
and video entertainment. The result was a war over enforcement of copyright on the
Internet, which still clouds the future of e-commerce.179
172 See infra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
173 Compare Sarah Jane Hughes, A Case for Regulating Cyberpayments, 51 ADMIN. L.
REV. 809, 813–14 (1999) (noting the demise of most cyberpayment systems as e-commerce
developed), with Hiller & Cook, supra note 168, at 98 (“To the extent electronic commerce
grows, it is certain that it will not flourish unless acceptable systems for payment are
available.”), and Kerry Lynn Macintosh, How to Encourage Global Electronic Commerce:
The Case for Private Currencies on the Internet, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 733, 738–39 (1998)
(arguing that the Internet needs its own private electronic currencies), and Robert F. Stankey,
Internet Payment Systems: Legal Issues Facing Businesses, Consumers and Payment Service
Providers, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 11, 12 (1998) (arguing that the percentage of credit
card transactions will decline as e-commerce grows).
174 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Legal and Technological Infrastructures for Electronic Payment
Systems, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Payment
Infrastructures for Open Systems, 3 DATA L. REP. 1, 20 (1995).
175 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of
ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 675, 676 (2000) (explaining why intermediary-provided dis-
pute resolution, such as credit card charge-backs and escrow arrangements, prove more attrac-
tive in practice than independent third-party mechanisms such as arbitration or mediation).
176 Id. at 690–94 (explaining credit card charge-back system).
177 Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail
Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 1002 (2008) (noting Amazon’s “renouned” one-click
patent).
178 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
See generally id. at 1360–66 (suggesting Amazon’s patent for one-click ordering might
be invalid).
179 See infra notes 180–213 and accompanying text.
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2. Copyright
Proliferation of personal computers set off alarm bells in the community of
intellectual property rightsholders, particularly those whose business models de-
pended on protecting copyright.180 As the Internet became more popular, major or-
ganizations of rightsholders aggressively promoted copy protection schemes and
launched aggressive litigation campaigns against perceived infringers.181
The ongoing controversy was shaped by the enactment of the DMCA, extension
of the copyright term, imposition of liability on major unlicensed file sharing ser-
vices, extension of secondary liability to intermediaries, and constriction of the fair
use privilege.182
a. DMCA
The DCMA183 prohibits circumvention of technological measures that effec-
tively control access to protected works184 and the use of technologies that facilitate
circumvention.185 This encourages copy protection, which reduces user flexibility
in working with copyrighted materials.186
b. Extension of Copyright Term
In Eldred v. Ashcroft,187 the Supreme Court rejected 7–2, a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA),188 which extended copyright
180 In 1974, the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) reported to Congress on the relationship of new technologies and the effectiveness
of copyright law. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGY USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS (1978), available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/contu18.html [hereinafter
CONTU Report]. Oddly, it limited its work to copyright protection for computer programs
and the potential of photocopiers to undermine copyright. See Note, Toward a Unified Theory
of Copyright Infringement for an Advanced Technological Era, 96 HARV. L. REV. 450, 451
& n.10 (1982) (noting technology’s potential to undermine the ability of copyright owners
to control distribution of their work and noting the limitation of CONTU).
181 See Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 695, 721–25 (2011) (describing Recording Industry Association of America liti-
gation initiative resulting in more than 30,000 civil action claims).
182 See infra notes 183–213 and accompanying text.
183 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
184 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006).
185 Id. § 1201(b).
186 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Flanking the DRM Maginot Line Against New Music Markets,
16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 113 (2007) (explaining and criticizing copy protection efforts).
187 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
188 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827–28 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1994)).
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protection from creation until seventy years after the author’s death and extended
the term for copyrights already existing at the time of enactment.189 The extension
reduces the portion of works in the public domain.190
c. Secondary Liability
The Supreme Court extended liability for secondary infringement of copyright
in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,191 holding that the distribu-
tor of music file-sharing software could be secondarily liable for direct infringement
by users of the software upon proof that the distributors clearly expressed intent that
the software be used for infringing activities.192
So far, lower courts have resisted attempts to expand secondary liability in other
contexts. In Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., the plaintiffs asked the dis-
trict court to hold YouTube liable for secondary infringement for failing to make it
easier for rightsholders to cause infringing material posted by others to be removed
from the YouTube site.193 The court granted summary judgment to the defendants,
holding that they satisfied the requirements of the DMCA safe harbor by insisting
on identification of specific infringing items before taking steps to remove them and
that they did not lose the safe harbor protection by failing to deploy more aggressive
infringement monitoring software.194
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service Ass’n, the court of appeals
affirmed dismissal of an action brought against credit card processors for copyright
infringement arising from their cardholders’ downloading copyrighted images from
third-party websites.195 The court of appeals, agreeing with the district court, found
that the credit card companies had no direct connection to that infringement.196
Although credit cards made it easier for websites to profit from infringing activity,
infringement could occur even without payment.197 Perfect 10 did not allege “specific
acts” by the credit card companies intended to encourage infringement.198 Finally,
even though the credit card processors could have stopped processing credit card
payments to the infringing websites, that did not mean that failure to do so equated to
vicarious infringement.199 The court easily rejected a claim of contributory trademark
189 Id.
190 Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 199, 201 (2003).
191 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
192 Id. at 928–41.
193 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516–19, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
194 Id. at 528–29.
195 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
196 Id. at 796.
197 Id. at 796–97.
198 Id. at 802.
199 Id. at 803.
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infringement, finding that the credit card companies had no power to control the
activities of the infringing sites.200
Potential secondary liability by intermediaries undercuts the immunity consid-
ered in Part II.E of this Article, and thus can lead to shutting out riskier forms of
content from the Internet. The DMCA’s safe harbor for intermediaries, analyzed in
Part II.G.2, combined with the result in the Viacom case,201 mitigates this risk.
d. Fair Use
By far the most important privilege within the Internet context is the fair use
privilege, codified in Title 17, § 107.202
The Supreme Court noted in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.203 and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.204 that the last factor—the market effect
of the purported fair use—is the most important.205 In recent years, the first factor—
the purpose and character of the use—has gained in importance as “transformative”
activities by accused infringers have been recognized as socially beneficial.206
Early cases involving the Internet took a restrictive view of fair use. In UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.,207 the district court denied the fair use defense
of an Internet web service that purchased tens of thousands of popular CDs and
copied recordings onto its web servers so that subscribers could play the recordings
from wherever they had Internet connections.208 In Bowers v. Baystate Technologies,
200 Id. at 807.
201 See supra notes 193–94.
202 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). This section was intended to codify decisional law, rather than
to expand or alter it. See Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, Inc. 482 F. Supp. 741, 745 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Section 107 explains that whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is fair use, and thus
non-infringing, is to be determined by consideration of a number of factors including:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or as for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
§ 107 (1)–(4).
203 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
204 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
205 Id. at 574; Sony, 464 U.S. at 476 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
206 See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the search
engine presentation of thumbnail sketches of copyrighted photographs to be transformative).
207 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
208 Id. at 350, 352.
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Inc.,209 the Federal Circuit held that the Copyright Act did not preempt enforcement
of a broad contractual prohibition on reverse engineering contained in a shrink-wrap
agreement, even though the contract had the effect of prohibiting what would be fair
use under the Copyright Act.210
More recently, courts have breathed life back into fair use. In Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp.,211 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part summary judgment in favor of search engine operators accused of copyright in-
fringement for presenting “thumbnail” versions of copyrighted images on its search
engine. The court stated that the uses were transformative due to the public benefit of
the search engine and because use of the plaintiff’s images in the thumbnails did not
harm the market for the plaintiff’s images or the value of his images.212 The plaintiff
was denied fair use with respect to full-size reproductions of the photographs.213
H. Security and Surveillance
The shift of information and communications to the Internet spawned concern
from the law enforcement and intelligence communities that many of their tradi-
tional investigatory and intelligence-collection tools would become ineffective. The
result has been the development of a variety of legal constraints and privileges re-
lated to electronic surveillance.
1. Wiretap Act and Stored Communications Act
Law enforcement authorities may compel access to communications and electron-
ic messages and files by obtaining warrants and other orders under the provisions of
the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act (SCA),214 or by obtaining a tra-
ditional search warrant under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.215
209 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
210 Id. at 1317, 1324.
211 280 F.3d 934.
212 Id. at 944.
213 Id. at 948.
214 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006) (authorizing for interception of wire, oral, and electronic
communications); id. § 2703 (noting stored communications); see Steve Jackson Games, Inc.
v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (assessing statutory damages
against Secret Service for violating Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Access Act).
215 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. Important differences exist between Rule 41 and Title III wiretap
orders: a search warrant may be issued by a magistrate judge, but a wiretap warrant must be
issued by an Article III judge; any federal law enforcement officer or attorney for the gov-
ernment may apply for a search warrant, but a wiretap warrant requires approval by desig-
nated high officials in the Justice Department; a search warrant may be issued upon a finding
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The requirements for accessing stored electronic communications under the SCA
are less demanding than the requirements for accessing live wire, oral, or electronic
communications under the Wiretap Act or under Rule 41.216 The procedures for in-
tercepting stored communications and for accessing remote computing facilities are
more flexible because the Fourth Amendment does not limit access to records kept
by third parties.217 The SCA addresses searches and seizures of three different types
of stored communications: (a) contents of stored electronic communications that
have been in electronic storage for 180 days or less; (b) contents of stored electronic
communications that have been in electronic storage for more than 180 days; and
(c) records, not involving content, concerning electronic communications.218 Stored
communications in storage for 180 days or less may be accessed pursuant to either
federal or state warrants.219 Information stored for more than 180 days may be
accessed with a warrant, with notice to the subscriber or customer under an admin-
istrative, grand jury, or trial subpoena; or pursuant to a court order based on a gov-
ernmental showing that the information sought is “relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.”220
Transactional records concerning stored electronic communications may be
accessed pursuant to a warrant, a court order such as that necessary for information
stored in excess of 180 days, a formal written request relevant to a law enforcement
investigation concerning telemarketing fraud, or an administrative subpoena autho-
rized by federal or state statute.221 The SCA immunizes e-mails stored on the servers
of an e-mail service provider from civil subpoenas.222
Pen/Trap orders223 are used for obtaining stored data, such as Twitter screen
names and subscriber information, the dates and times such screen names were used,
IP addresses used, and information on payment methods.224
of probable cause but a wiretap warrant requires additional findings, including a finding that
other investigative procedures are impracticable. Compare id., with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518.
216 See supra note 214.
217 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441–43 (1976).
218 § 2703.
219 Id. § 2703(a).
220 Id. § 2703(b)–(d); see also Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F.
Supp. 432, 432–33 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (awarding damages for violation of ECPA stored
communications provisions but finding no Title I interception).
221 § 2703(c).
222 See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 975–76 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (reviewing case law and holding that immunity extended to certain private Facebook
postings).
223 §§ 3121–3127.
224 See In re: § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430 (E.D. Va. 2011) (rejecting challenge
to sealed SCA order compelling disclosure by Twitter). The court held that, because the
government did not seek access to communications content, it need not meet the higher
standards of content disclosure under the SCA. Id. at 434–35.
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In United States v. Warshak,225 the court of appeals held that:
[A] subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of emails “that are stored with, or sent or received
through, a commercial ISP.”. . . The government may not com-
pel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber’s
emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.
Therefore, because they did not obtain a warrant, the govern-
ment agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they obtained
the contents of Warshak’s emails. Moreover, to the extent that the
SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such emails
warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.226
2. Carnivore
Carnivore (renamed DCS-1000 in 2001) was a controversial system used by the
FBI to facilitate court-ordered intercepts of Internet communications and transac-
tional data, including e-mail and web communications.227 The Carnivore controversy
illustrates adaptation of traditional surveillance technologies and law to networked
environments. Before Carnivore existed, an ISP was often unable to comply with an
225 631 F.3d at 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
226 Id. at 288 (citations omitted). Although the government obtained access to about 27,000
e-mails without informing the subscriber, the court held that the evidence obtained from the
e-mails could not be excluded from a criminal trial because the government relied in good
faith on the SCA. Id.
227 For an extensive commentary on Carnivore, see Maricela Segura, Note, Is Carnivore
Devouring your Privacy?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 231, 235–36 (2001), and Ted Bridis, FBI Stops
Using Carnivore Wiretap Software, USATODAY.COM (Jan. 1, 2009, 2:29 AM), http://www
.usatoday.com/tech/news/surveillance/2005-01-19-carnivore-obsolete_x.htm. Carnivore was
originally modified sniffer software developed by the FBI and deployed on a Pentium III
microcomputer. Jeff Tyson, How Carnivore Worked, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, http://www
.howstuffworks.com/carnivore3.htm. When the Carnivore system was attached to a local area
network segment by one-way tap, the FBI could execute a court order to eavesdrop on elec-
tronic communications. Id. Depending on the content of the order, Carnivore was set to inter-
cept and record only those packets containing certain IP addresses, e-mail addresses, or text
strings. See id.
The network interface card installed with the Carnivore software “saw” all of the packets
traversing the particular network segment into which Carnivore was connected, but only
those packets meeting the specified criteria were recorded for further processing. Id. The
recorded packets were written as a file on a zip drive, along with a file containing the settings
for the session that resulted in the creation of that data file. Id. See generally ILL. INST. OF
TECH. RESEARCH INST., INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM: FINAL
REPORT (2000), available at http://epic.org/privacy/carnivore/carniv_final.pdf [hereinafter
CARNIVORE REPORT].
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order because most widely available sniffer software intercepted too much. If an ISP
turned over to the FBI more information than was authorized under a court order,
the FBI might not be able to use any of the information as evidence in a subsequent
prosecution. Getting too much information constitutes a failure to “minimize” the
eavesdropping and often justifies suppression of all the information, not just that
portion that exceeds the court order.
Accordingly, technical personnel at the FBI’s Quantico laboratory undertook to
program limitations onto traditional sniffer functionality so that whenever an ISP
was unable to supply only the information authorized by a court order, the FBI could
itself deploy a system that would obtain only the authorized information.228
When word of the system’s existence leaked, much controversy erupted, leading
to congressional hearings.229 Attorney General Janet Reno, after evaluating competing
proposals, selected the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute (IITRI) to
perform a review.230 I was the senior legal member of the review team, which issued
its final report in December of 2000.231 We concluded that,
[w]hen Carnivore is used in accordance with a Title III order, it
provides investigators with no more information than is permitted
by a given court order . . . . [that] Carnivore reduces, but does
not eliminate, risk of both intentional and unintentional unau-
thorized acquisition of electronic communication information
by FBI personnel, but introduces little additional risk of acqui-
sition by persons other than FBI personnel.232
The report made a number of specific technical recommendations to prevent errors
in setting up Carnivore in a particular deployment and to improve audit trails.233
3. CALEA
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)234 obli-
gates telecommunication service providers to design their networks to facilitate
eavesdropping by law enforcement authorities. All of CALEA’s required capabili-
ties are expressly premised on the condition that any information will be obtained
“pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization.”235 The FCC may not, under
228 CARNIVORE REPORT, supra note 227, at 1.
229 Id. at 3.
230 Id. at 2.
231 Id.
232 Id. at xii.
233 Id. at xiv–xv.
234 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2006).
235 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing 47 U.S.C
§ 1002(a)(1)–(2)).
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CALEA, “require carriers to provide the government with information that ‘is not
authorized to be intercepted.’”236 CALEA applies to “telecommunications carriers,”
but not to “information services.”237 Drawing the line between the two has engendered
much controversy.
In U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set
aside certain parts of the FCC’s CALEA rules.238 The court approved the FCC’s
interpretation of call-identifying information, available under CALEA, to include
antenna tower location for cell phone calls.239 The court embraced the FCC’s reason-
ing that antenna tower information simply puts law enforcement agencies in the
same position they had in monitoring plain old telephone service, where the tele-
phone number provides location information.240 The court also approved the require-
ment to make packet-mode data available.241
The litigation was a precursor to several controversies involved in Carnivore: the
argument about Smith v. Maryland’s242 distinction between content and dialed digits,
the argument over interception of new data, such as antenna location, to make up for
the absence of location information implicit with wire line wiretaps, and the challenge
of separating header and payload data from packet-based communications—an issue
strongly influencing some criticisms of Carnivore for over-collecting in pen mode.
In 2005, the FCC extended CALEA to Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and to
broadband access providers,243 a decision approved in American Council on Education
v. FCC.244 The FCC rejected the government’s proposal that new technologies re-
ceive advance approval, finding that implementing the “proposal would have a chill-
ing effect on innovation.”245
4. Mobile Device Location Information
District courts and courts of appeals disagree about whether “prospective cell
site” data—information showing the location of a cell phone user—is available under
236 Id. at 465–66.
237 Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 1002(a)).
238 U.S. Telecom, 227 F.3d at 450, 453.
239 Id. at 463.
240 Id. 463–64.
241 Id. at 464–65.
242 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
243 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Services, 20 FCC Rcd. 14989 (2005).
244 451 F.3d 226 (explaining requirements of CALEA, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010, to make
certain telecommunications networks available for electronic eavesdropping by law en-
forcement agencies).
245 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Services, 21 FCC Rcd. 5360, 5395–96 (2006).
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the Wiretap Act, the SCA, the Pen/Trap Act, or a combination of them, or whether
probable cause must be shown.
In In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of
Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government,246 the
court of appeals held that the magistrate judge “erred in allowing her impressions of
the general expectation of privacy of citizens to transform that standard into anything
else. . . . [t]h[e] standard is a lesser one than probable cause . . . .”247 Whether the
probable cause or subsection (d) requirement applies may depend on the length of
time for which historical cell site information (CSI) is sought.248 A magistrate judge
in another circuit relied in part on the Third Circuit’s analysis to exercise his discre-
tion to require probable cause for access to historical CSI for a period of 113 days.249
In In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Authority,250 the district court rejected access to prospective cell site lo-
cation data under the wiretap statute (or under the Pen/Trap or SCA) because “[c]ell
site data does not reflect the ‘contents’ of a communication.”251 It also denied access
to the data under the SCA subscriber records category.252 In In re Application of
United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register
Device, A Trap and Trace Device, and for Geographic Location Information,253
reviewing the other district court decisions to date,254 the district court concluded
that the only authority for prospective cell site information was Rule 41, necessi-
tating a finding of probable cause.255 Other cases reach conflicting results.256
246 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
247 Id. at 313.
248 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Information, No. 11-MC-0113 (JO), 2011 WL 679925, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
2011) (granting order under subsection (d) and distinguishing historical data for longer
period, for which probable cause is necessary); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006).
249 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-
Site Information, No. 10-MC-0897, 2010 WL 5437209, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010).
250 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
251 Id. at 758.
252 Id. (referring to SCA subscriber records category under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)).
253 497 F. Supp. 2d 301 (D.P.R. 2007).
254 Id. at 303–04.
255 Id. at 311.
256 Compare In re Application of the U. S. for an Order, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 826–36
(S.D. Tex. 2006) (rejecting the government’s hybrid theory), and In re Application of the
U.S. for an Order, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 212 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that a judicial officer
should not be able to extrapolate from separate and independent statutory provisions au-
thority to obtain “real time” cell location data on anything less than a showing of probable
cause), and In re Application of the U.S. for an Order, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding that combination of CALEA and the Wiretap Act without probable cause did not
authorize government to obtain location information by means of pen/trap order), and In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (rejecting access
to cell site location data, reasoning that the three statutes—the SCA, the CALEA, and the
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Continued confusion over this issue is likely to result in more intrusive govern-
ment surveillance based on mobile Internet technologies. If Congress intervenes, it
is not certain whether it will act to protect personal privacy or to facilitate what law
enforcement and intelligence communities say is necessary.
II. CONFRONTING THREATS TO THE FUTURE
The Internet has established itself as one of the dominant means for political
communication, one of the principal channels for commerce, and is becoming the
most important distribution mechanism for art and entertainment.257 As these trends
continue, certain legal and policy issues will intensify.
During its first two decades, the Internet encountered a variety of actual or per-
ceived threats to its continued growth and to its fundamental architectural character-
istics. As the following sections of this Article show, some of the apparent threats
turned out not to be real, and a combination of entrepreneurial and legal creativity
accommodated others. The future also contains potential threats. Some will not mate-
rialize, while others may undermine the Internet’s constitution, diverting politics,
social interaction, commerce, and art into other infrastructures, leaving the Internet
as a historical shooting star. Still others might fundamentally crush the grassroots
energy on both consumer and supplier sides that have made the Internet a success.
The most important of the threats are the replacement of the Internet’s decentral-
ized character with an oligopolistic cluster of proprietary empires, the loss of net
neutrality and discrimination against content in other forms, the eclipse of the public
domain by holders of copyright monopolies, chilling of behaviorally targeted adver-
tising, and overreaction to perceived security threats.258
A. Proprietary Empires
Proprietary empires have already emerged amid the Internet’s success: Google
for searches, Amazon for e-commerce, iTunes for music, and Netflix and Hulu for
video entertainment. So far, their imperial policies have been benign, even in the
Pen/Trap Statute—did not authorize the requested eavesdropping), and In re Application of
the U.S. for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding certification of rele-
vance under Pen/Trap statute insufficient and that probable cause was required), and In re
Application for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (classifying prospective cell
site data as tracking device information under 18 U.S.C. § 3117 and not as minimal Pen/Trap
information, rejecting government’s hybrid statutory argument, and stating access without
showing a probable cause would raise serious Fourth Amendment concerns), with In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682–83 (W.D. La. 2006) (granting
request for cell site location data under the same argument based on the three statutes).
257 See Shikar Ghosh, Making Sense of the Internet, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1998,
at 126, 126–27.
258 See, e.g., Values and Principles, INTERNETSOCIETY.ORG, http://www.internetsociety
.org/node/21 (last visited May 1, 2012).
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case of Amazon, in facilitating market access by small entrepreneurs.259 Imperial
policies could change, however. If they do, the possibility of regulating through
technology is far more threatening to the Internet’s constitution than traditional
governmental regulation backed up by legal institutions.260
The Internet is defined by its open architecture, as explained in Part I.B, but eco-
nomic incentives exist to close the architecture. Most suppliers of services through
the Internet have an incentive to allow it to function as intended—freely granting
access to their own services to other suppliers performing complementary services.261
Circumstances also exist, however, in which supplier self-interest is served by block-
ing access. These typically involve a monopoly position by the one denying access.
Monopolies may arise for several reasons. For example, a supplier may have
proprietary interconnection technologies protected by intellectual property law offer-
ing features that distinguish it from competitors. In such circumstances, suppliers of
complementary products may be willing to pay higher-than-market rates for access,
so they can incorporate the proprietary features in the integrated offering to consumers.
They expect to earn more than enough revenue from the integrated product to cover
the supernormal fees paid to the owner of the proprietary features. The owner of the
proprietary features makes a rational economic decision as to whether its profits will
be larger if it charges a competitive access fee and has a larger customer base, or if
it charges a higher fee262 resulting in a smaller customer base. Apple provides an ex-
ample of this phenomenon, resulting at different times in the adoption of compet-
ing philosophies. At some points, and for some products, Apple maintains a “closed
system”: no independent supplier of complementary products and services is al-
lowed to interconnect them with Apple’s proprietary features unless it enters into a
contract and pays what are presumably supernormal fees to Apple.263 Other times,
as with iPhone applications, Apple has adopted an open approach in which it pro-
vides the necessary interface specifications and privileges to the world, allowing
entrepreneurs to develop their applications as they wish.264 Thousands of Apps were
259 Jill Priluck, Ahead in the Cloud, SLATE (Nov. 24, 2010, 12:43 PM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/business/small_business/2010/11/ahead_in_the_cloud.html.
260 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 81–82 (2006) (explaining how reg-
ulation by technological restrictions is more subversive of liberty than traditional legal regu-
lation by the state).
261 See Complaint at 15–17, United States v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 00-2789 (D.D.C. June 27,
2001) (describing incentives for networks confronted with network externalities to interconnect).
262 Economists would call this “monopoly rents.” See generally Anne O. Krueger, The
Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974).
263 See Rui Li, Note, Antitrust, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Online Music Industry:
An Antitrust Analysis of Apple’s Combination of Services and Products, NAT’L L. REV. 1–2,
5 (2011), available at http://www.natlawreview.com/article/antitrust-intellectual-property
-rights-and-online-music-industry-antitrust-analysis-apple-s-.
264 See Charles M. Davidson & Michael J. Santorelli, Seizing the Moment: Spectrum
Allocation Policy for the Wireless Broadband Century, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 13–14
(2010). But see id. at 42.
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available for the iPhone in early 2010.265 Millions of iPhone users enthusiastically
downloaded these Apps, resulting in higher profits for Apple because of the sale of
more iPhones, as well as higher profits for AT&T and other iPhone service provid-
ers because consumers using Apps use more bandwidth for which they pay the
service providers.266
The iPhone’s open architecture267 for applications did not result from any in-
tervention by the legal system. No court, legislature, or administrative agency told
Apple that it was forbidden from closing the iPhone interfaces. Rather, it occurred
because Apple made an independent, self-interested economic judgment that an
open architecture would produce higher profits. The experience of the Internet and
e-commerce strongly reinforces the attractiveness of such an open approach.
Occasionally—especially in the early days of e-commerce268—offerors of websites,
such as directories and indexes, embrace the business model in which specific
vendors would be included only if they paid a fee. In almost all cases these business
models have been unsuccessful and are abandoned.269 Directories and indexes
proliferate. Almost none charge a fee for inclusion.270 The motivation for the busi-
ness model is premised on using free inclusion to fuel demand for other services for
which a fee is charged or by noneconomic motives.
Situations exist and are likely to recur, however, when suppliers are antagonistic
to this open architecture philosophy. Some of them have established businesses, the
outputs of which are being drawn into the Internet’s information infrastructure, and
the owners and operators of these businesses are unable to develop a business model
in which these outputs can be offered for free while still sustaining the enterprise.271
Major record labels, film studios, and other owners of rights in entertainment con-
tent are clear examples. In other cases, economic misfortune has confronted estab-
lished enterprises for reasons not directly associated with exploitation of their outputs
265 Id. at 13–14; Matt Silverman, iPhone Apps List 2010: 700+ Apps Reviewed by Category,
MASHABLE TECH (Jan. 3, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/01/03/iphone-apps-2010/.
266 See Mike Bremin, Can’t We Enjoy Anything Without Paying for It??, TECHMENTO
(Mar. 19, 2011), http://techmento.com/2011/03/19/att_tethering_devices_payup/.
267 Definition of: Open Architecture, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia
_term/0,2542,t=open+architecture&i=48446,00.asp (last visited May 1, 2012).
268 In this context, “e-commerce” simply means developing and deploying Internet ser-
vices with a profit motive.
269 See, e.g., Barry Schwartz, Yahoo To Drop Paid Inclusion Program, SEARCH ENGINE
LAND (Oct. 15, 2009, 4:20 PM), http://searchengineland.com/yahoo-to-drop-paid-inclusion
-program-27852.
270 Barry Schwartz, Confirmed: Bing Tests Ads Within Organic Search Results, SEARCH
ENGINE LAND (July 22, 2011, 4:49 PM), http://searchengineland.com/bing-tests-ads-within
-organic-search-results-86957.
271 See Danny Sullivan, 2000 In Review: AdWords Launches; Yahoo Partners with Google;
GoTo Syndicates, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Feb. 1, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://searchengineland
.com/2000-in-review-adwords-launches-yahoo-partners-with-google-34831.
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to the Internet.272 The owners and operators of these businesses are scrambling to find
substantive revenue streams, which causes them to look greedily at the possibility of
generating revenue by charging for access to their outputs through the Internet. The
newspaper and magazine industries at the end of 2009 provide clear examples.273
In most cases, the law does not need to get involved. The marketplace will de-
cide whether closed approaches are viable, force suppliers to embrace the open arch-
itecture, or risk being driven from the market. In many instances, fee-based services
survive and flourish; for example, thousands of lawyers pay substantial fees for ac-
cessing court decisions and statutes offered through the Internet by Westlaw and
Lexis, millions of music fans pay iTunes ninety-nine cents per song or more to
download music, and travelers expect to pay fees for airline tickets and hotel rooms
through the Internet. No serious analyst proposes that the law must intervene to
force these services to be made available for free.
Other circumstances exist, though, posing a danger to the well-being of econom-
ic life or to the viability of the Internet’s core philosophy, which present stronger
cases for legal intervention.274 The dynamics of a monopoly typically lead to three
272 See Reinventing the Newspaper, ECONOMIST, July 9, 2011, at 7–9 (discussing problems
facing news organizations).
273 See David Milstead, Newspapers’ Perilous Paywall Moment, EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
Aug. 2010, at 30–35.
274 Microeconomic theory teaches that monopolists can and will charge a higher price for
the same good or service that would be priced lower in a competitive market. In a compet-
itive market, assuming that all firms have the same cost curve, any firm has an incentive to
sell at a price high enough for it to earn revenue even slightly in excess of cost. No firm can
charge a price higher than another firm because that would shift demand from the firm charg-
ing the higher price to firms with a lower price. That means that the price for every firm in
the market is the price at which the marginal revenue curve crosses the marginal cost curve.
At a lower price, firms would lose money because their revenue would not cover their costs;
at a higher price, profits would be higher but other firms could gain market share by charging
a price that just covers cost.
The position of a monopolist is different because, by definition, it does not face the
competitive threat of any other firm offering a lower price. Having the flexibility to set its
price wherever it wants, the monopolist sets its price to maximize profits. Under the usual
assumptions of elastic demand (elastic demand means that consumers buy less at a higher
price and more at a lower price), the monopolist sets a higher price resulting in lower demand,
where the revenue gains are sufficient to offset the reduced demand. Because consumers
have to pay a higher price and consume less they are worse off. The difference between the
benefit to the monopolist and the loss to consumers is called the “net welfare loss.”
Monopolies are unstable in markets that have a competitive structure. A monopolist may
exist, for example, if the monopolist was an innovator and entered the market with a product
as to which it was the only offeror, but the competitive market conditions mean that others
will enter charging prices less than the monopoly price and take market share away from the
original monopolist. So a monopoly can be maintained only under one or both of two con-
ditions: (1) the monopolist imposes artificial barriers to entry and is able to enforce them, or
(2) the size of the market is such that at a monopoly price, the monopolist (but not new
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elements of public policy. The first, deeply embedded in the rationale for public
utility regulation, is that price controls should be imposed on monopolists who enjoy
natural monopolies.275 By limiting monopoly pricing, the state can protect against
reallocating resources from consumers to monopolists.
Second, the law can remove artificial barriers to entry. One such barrier to entry
is “predatory pricing” by the monopolist. Predatory pricing signifies that a monopo-
list, threatened by the prospect of a new entrant, will reduce prices in the short run
to a level below that at which the new entrant can earn a profit.276 A monopolist can
afford to do this, either because it can forego some of its monopoly profits in the
short run in order to retain its monopoly in the long run, or because it has banked
enough excess monopoly profits in the past to allow it to finance a short-term loss
as a good investment to increase prices later and reinstate its monopoly profits.
Antitrust law developed a complex set of rules to determine when predatory pricing
exists and when it should be illegal.277
Third, the law can protect against denials of access to essential facilities and
services by the monopolist.278 That, essentially, is what the debate over net neutrality
is all about.279
The greatest threat to enhanced social welfare resulting from the Internet’s open
architecture arises when a supplier of services at one layer seeks to extend its ser-
vices into other layers—in other words, to engage in vertical integration. Pursuit of
this strategy benefits from discouraging competing suppliers in the layers where the
vertically integrating enterprise has weaker competitive offerings. This situation of-
ten arises when the market structure of one layer is a natural monopoly, because of
entrants) faces a declining cost-curve. The declining cost-curve case is called a “natural
monopoly.” In such conditions, if demand increases at the monopoly price, the monopolist
simply can produce more and, because its costs decline, still earn higher profits.
However, one of the central assumptions of microeconomic theory is that, at some point,
costs increase with increasing production. Increased shifts must be added at higher labor
costs, the price for raw materials increases, or congestion or other inefficiencies begin to
increase costs per unit. When a natural monopoly exists because at the initial level of demand
a monopolist faces a declining cost curve, the monopolist still confronts the threat that
demand will increase to the point that its costs will increase if it produces more. At that point,
there is room for new entrants because they probably can serve the increased demand at
lower costs than the monopolist. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER,
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY (7th ed. 1997).
275 See Charles W. Lamden, The Place of Accounting in Price Control, 18 ACCT. REV.,
Jan. 1943, at 26, 26–27.
276 See Brocke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221–28
(1993).
277 See, e.g., The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
278 See PERRITT, supra note 73, § 2.04[B] (2011 supp.) (discussing “essential facilities
doctrine” in antitrust law).
279 See infra Part II.B.
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network effects or otherwise, while the market structure of adjacent layers is in-
herently competitive.280
The vice when natural monopolies at one level are leveraged to create an arti-
ficial monopoly at other levels is not the natural monopoly. By definition, a natural
monopoly is more efficient when it is allowed to run its course—at least until the
monopolist starts extracting monopoly rents.281 Instead, the vice is the artificial ex-
clusion of competition in adjacent layers where competition is the natural state.
Many parts of the Internet’s technologies present economies of scale. When
economies of scale exist, bigger is better—or at least more efficient—even though
the economies may not be strong enough to present network effects leading to
natural monopoly. It may simply be that the capital cost of a cell phone site is so
great that no one can make money unless he has hundreds of thousands of customers
to support that site. Or, it may not be profitable to deploy DSL or fiber to the curb
in a market for telephone services unless a sufficient subscriber base exists to pro-
vide a return on the substantial investment. Network effects also operate with re-
spect to any one-stop shopping facility, such as iTunes, Amazon, or Netflix.
In these circumstances, the owner of the capital-intensive resource—or a
potential investor in a new such resource—has an incentive to exclude people who
do not pay. It has a concomitant incentive not to allow its competitors to get a free
ride on its investment to offer competing services at prices lower than the owner
must charge to recoup its investment. It is this set of circumstances that gives rise
to the most ferocious legal battles over how the Internet should be regulated—the
battle over competitive access to telephone infrastructure and, more recently, the
battle over net neutrality.282
Three basic kinds of access denials occur. The first two are vertical, the third is
horizontal. In one type of vertical denial of access, a firm with substantial market
share refuses to deal with an upstream supplier because it already has arrangements
with a preferred upstream supplier. An example might be a refusal by AT&T to sell
cell phones made by someone other than Apple. In another type of vertical denial of
access, a firm with substantial market share refuses to sell to customers competing
with preferred customers. One example is a manufacturer that refuses to sell its prod-
uct to discount retailers. Another is Apple’s refusal to sell iPhones that work on any
network other than AT&T’s. In the horizontal context, a firm with substantial market
280 Wilko Bolt & David B. Humphrey, Public Good Issues in Target: Natural Monopoly,
Scale Economies, Network Effects and Cost Allocation 6–7 (European Cent. Bank, Working
Paper No. 505, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=750785.
281 See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(expressing doubt whether traditional antitrust monopolization doctrines are appropriate
“in technologically dynamic markets characterized by network effects”).
282 Zack Christenson, Some Think It Is OK for the Government to Do What Net Neutrality
Would Prevent Others from Doing, AM. CONSUMER INST. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www
.theamericanconsumer.org/2011/03/01/cfa.
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share refuses to cooperate; for example, by interconnecting with a competitor—
usually a new entrant that threatens to take away market share.
Concern is growing that concentration in the telecommunications market may
eviscerate the Internet’s potential to provide an infrastructure in which competition
can flourish. The FCC has generally allowed concentration to increase through major
telephone firm mergers, arguing that new technologies and intermodal competition
will preserve competitor opportunities and consumer choices. The FCC approved two
major mergers of local exchange carrier networks with long-distance networks: the
merger of Verizon and MCI,283 and the merger of SBC and AT&T.284 In March 2007,
a district court approved the consent decrees recommended by the Justice Department
in the SBC/AT&T and Verizon/MCI mergers.285
Concentration in the cable industry, like concentration in the telephone industry,
is intensifying. In July 2006, the FCC approved transfer of Adelphia Communica-
tions Corporation’s assets to Time Warner and Comcast.286 The FCC accepted the
argument that the consolidation might result in reduced competition in the market
for programming, and adopted a condition that would allow programmers seeking
to use commercial leased access to submit disputes about the terms of access to
commercial arbitration.287 It also found that the possibility of uniform price increases
could reduce competition.288 The FCC further adopted commercial arbitration as a
condition to mitigate that risk289 and imposed detailed provisions for any arbitration
proceedings in an appendix to its decision.290
Empires are emerging that control backbone connectivity, but that is not all.
Empires are also developing with respect to content distribution. Whether these em-
pires pose threats to the Internet’s constitution depends on imperial business policies.
One can speculate on adverse directions for evolution. For example, Google domi-
nates the market for Internet search and for search-related advertising. Its e-mail
service, Gmail, represents a rapidly growing share of the market.291 Its Android soft-
ware for smart phones has displaced Apple’s dominance of this market.292 Google
has also entered the hardware market. It has launched Google+, a social networking
283 In re Verizon Commc’ns Inc. and MCI, Inc., 20 FCC Rcd. 18433 (2005).
284 In re SBC Commc’ns Inc. and AT&T Corp., 20 FCC Rcd. 18290 (2005).
285 United States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2007).
286 In re Adelphia Commc’n Corp., 21 FCC Rcd. 8203, 8332 (2006).
287 Id. at 8253–54.
288 Id. at 8273.
289 Id. at 8274.
290 Id. app. B.
291 Erick Schonfeld, Gmail Grew 43 Percent Last Year. AOL Mail and Hotmail Need to
Start Worrying, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 14, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/01/14/gmail-grew
-43-percent-last-year-aol-mail-and-hotmail-need-to-start-worrying/.
292 Jay Yarow, Android Blows Past Apple to Take the Lead in Market Share for App
Downloads, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-10
-24/tech/30315528_1_android-apps-ios-smartphone.
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service aimed at Facebook’s market.293 Suppose Google makes a business decision
to discourage competition in these markets. It could make it difficult for users of
Android software to connect to e-mail services other than Gmail. It could provide
display and search-order preferences to advertisers who book advertising directly
with Google rather than with competing ad agencies. It could make it easy for
Google+ members to find new friends through their Gmail accounts, while making
it more difficult for Facebook members to do the same. The result would be a mar-
ket structure in which Internet users obtain a larger and larger portion of their cyber-
space resources through Google rather than its competitors.
As another example, take Amazon. It is the largest e-commerce vendor.294 To
date, Amazon has been aggressive in opening up access to competing suppliers of
books and entertainment products and merchandise.295 When one searches for a par-
ticular type of merchandise, Amazon routinely provides links to several suppliers,
including itself.296 It makes it easy to download Kindle books to other display devices.
It facilitates access to small, independent authors and publishers of conventional books
and their e-book counterparts. But suppose Amazon changed its business model. It
could make it more difficult for consumers to find competitive sellers of books,
video, audio entertainment or the immense variety of other goods that Amazon sells.
It could eliminate the possibility of downloading Kindle books to devices other than
the Kindle itself. Similar possibilities exist for the handful of large ISPs such as
AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast to violate net neutrality, as considered in Part II.B.
Proprietary empires also enlarge risks of political discrimination beyond the reach
of the rule of law.297 If the development of cloud computing induces a significant
fraction of individual and institutional users to use the cloud to store their documents
and other electronic assets, this will have three major effects: (1) it will increase the
vulnerability of Internet users to attacks on major repositories of data, (2) it will
make it easier for empires to gain new territory and make it more costly for users to
293 See Susan Mayes Ostrander, Google Plus vs. Facebook: Who’s Winning?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/20/google-vs-facebook_n
_972080.html.
294 See Erick Schonfeld, How Amazon Controls Ecommerce (Slides), TECHCRUNCH
(May 11, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/05/11/how-amazon-controls-ecommerce-slides/
(estimating Amazon controls one-third of e-commerce).
295 See Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, Suddenly, Amazon Starts Competing with Its Biggest
Suppliers, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 30, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-05
-11/tech/30022890_1_amazon-s-kindle-amazon-publishers.
296 See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com (last visited May 1, 2012).
297 See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town-Hall Democracy
or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413 (1997) (discussing the relationship
between the Internet and regulation); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory
Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215 (2001) (discussing private and public,
or “hybrid regulation”).
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move from one empire to another,298 and (3) it will make it easier for governments
and private institutions to eavesdrop on individual Internet activity. No longer will
an eavesdropper have to gain access to data stored on a particular, individually
owned device; all that will be necessary is to gain access to a particular empire in
the cloud.299 It may make it easier to censor unpopular content.300
B. Discrimination and Net Neutrality
The rise of proprietary empires in the Internet—more concretely, consolidation in
the telephone and cable industries—is fueling debate in Congress and before the FCC
on “net neutrality”: the fear that providers of basic infrastructure will design or pro-
gram their facilities to give preferential treatment to certain suppliers or customers.301
The growth of major bottlenecks in the Internet, represented by large ISPs and
connection services such as AT&T and Compuserve present the threat of censor-
ship.302 ISPs are under pressure to block services likely to facilitate access to content
infringing copyright303 and to expel infringing users,304 YouTube is threatened with
liability for not being more active in detecting and removing allegedly infringing video
posts,305 and Craigslist is being pressured to remove its “adult services” section.306
These developments not only threaten the fundamental architecture of the
Internet, making the establishment of empires more likely, as considered in Part II.A,
298 See generally Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761 (2011) (arguing
that the FCC should alter its philosophy based on the separation between telecommunications
and computing and assure access to cloud computing utilities); id. at 1819 (arguing that “utility
regulation should be the starting point for public policy discussions” of cloud computing).
299 Id. at 1819–20 (discussing the need for restrictions on government access to content
stored in the cloud).
300 Id. at 1820–21 (discussing danger of censorship imposed through the cloud).
301 See Josh Peterson, FCC Net Neutrality Rules Take Effect, Experts Doubt Longevity,
DAILY CALLER (Nov. 21, 2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/11/21/fcc-net-neutrality-rules
-take-effect-experts-doubt-longevity/.
302 See generally Dawn C. Nunziato, The First Amendment Issue of Our Time, 29 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 1 (2010) (assessing the net neutrality debate in the context of
political speech that might be suppressed by ISPs).
303 See Fred von Lohmann, FCC Rules Against Comcast for BitTorrent Blocking,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 3, 2008), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/08/fcc
-rules-against-comcast-bit-torrent-blocking (describing Comcast’s blocking of BitTorrent
traffic and FCC reaction).
304 See David Kravets, Top Internet Providers Cool to RIAA 3-Strikes Plan, WIRED
(Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/draft-verizon-o/.
305 See supra Part I.E.2.c (discussing the Viacom case).
306 See Thad D, The Ultimate Showdown: Blumenthal v. Craigslist, YALE L. & TECH.
(Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.yalelawtech.org/net-neutrality/the-ultimate-showdown-blumenthal
-v-craigslist/ (discussing dangers to free speech of efforts by state attorneys general to get
Craigslist to remove the “Adult Services” section).
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but they also increase the possibility of pressure to discriminate against particular
groups or points of view, such as gay rights advocates or Muslims.
The debate on net neutrality implicates technological, economic, and regula-
tory issues. The technological concern arises from the way Internet routers work. A
router is a specialized computer that knows how to read the headers of Internet
packets and to handle the packets according to the Internet address of the destination
and the Internet address of the origin. A router accepts a flow of Internet packets at its
input port—a wire pair, coaxial cable, or optical fiber, any of which might be con-
nected to a wireless channel—strips off the information comprising the “envelope”
prescribed by the network communications protocol such as Ethernet, frame relay,
or asynchronous transfer mode, and examines the destination address of the Internet
packet inside. It then consults a routing table maintained in an active memory inside
the router and, based on the entry in the routing table corresponding to the destination
address, sends that Internet packet to one of two or more output ports. Each output
port on a router is connected to another router, perhaps hundreds or thousands of
miles away. The routing tables are periodically updated through specialized messages
that move through the Internet that normally are invisible to users of the Internet.
Internet packets move from origin to destination through a series of routers. These
moves typically are called “hops.” Functionally, the Internet thus can be represented
as a logical tree in which each router represents a node at which two or more choices
are available as to the path a packet follows to the next node. In theory, an arbitrarily
large and complex network can be constructed from a binary tree, signifying that each
router has only two output ports. In practice, routers handling substantial amounts of
traffic have more than two output ports.
The links in such a tree represent the communications channels connecting the
routers. As explained in Part I.A, the Internet is indifferent as to the physical, prop-
agation, or modulation techniques used to carry Internet traffic. Accordingly, one
link may be a dial-up telephone line, another link may be a hard-wired wire pair,
another link may be an optical fiber capable of moving gigabits per second.
The decision that each router makes with respect to each Internet packet is
roughly analogous to the decision that an airline passenger makes in advance with
respect to changing planes at a hub airport. Usually, more than one route is available
from a particular origin to a particular destination, just as more than one airline route
typically is available from one airport to a destination airport. The passenger arrives
on one flight at a particular gate—representing an input port—and may leave on any
one of several flights departing from other gates, representing output ports. Hub
airports, of course, unlike Internet routers, have dozens or hundreds of input ports
(gates) and dozens or hundreds of output ports (gates). Moreover, the route followed
by an airline traveler, unlike the route followed by an Internet packet, is determined
in advance through the reservation and ticketing processes. Nevertheless, there are
decisions made at airports that resemble decisions made in routers. An airline pas-
senger ticket for a flight involving changes of planes specifies the input flight, and
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the airline dispatch operation determines the input port (gate) at which that flight
arrives. The passenger ticket only defines the departure flight; it does not define the
gate. The passenger, much like the router, must consult a display board or an airline
representative to determine which output port (gate) corresponds to the departure
flight number. That corresponds to a router looking up the appropriate output port
corresponding to a destination address in its routing table.
Multiple strategies exist for routing packets over the Internet. For example,
computer scientists and designers of Internet traffic patterns sometimes deploy rout-
ing strategies that involve the fewest hops. Other times, they employ strategies that
select the path through the Internet with the highest bandwidth. Routing strategies
also can be chosen based on economic decisions.307 These choices are reflected in
the routing tables of the routers at particular points in the Internet that have routing
tables appropriate to implement the strategy.
The economic incentives are strong for providers of high-bandwidth IP services
in a duopolistic market to discriminate in favor of their own offerings or to strike
deals with independent suppliers that give them traffic handling preferences.308
The result may not be transparent to consumers. Consumers will pay more money
for higher bandwidth connections in their homes and offices, but they will not be
forced to pay surcharges for access to disfavored services. Instead the providers of
the disfavored services will have to pay more for their connectivity. Because some
will not pay, consumers will see worse performance from the disfavored services.309
If things evolve this way, it will be difficult to organize a political coalition to force
net neutrality obligations into law.
Many advocates of the Internet’s potential to form the basic national infra-
structure for communications, information dissemination, and entertainment are
concerned about the adverse effects of growing concentration in the provision of
Internet connectivity. This concern has been focused through a public debate on “net
neutrality.” To understand the net neutrality debate, which constitutes the major cur-
rent public policy debate pitting communications service providers against Internet
users, one can benefit from a review of two basic realities, the first dealing with
technology and the second dealing with economics.
No one owns the entire Internet. Instead, the Internet is a collection of concepts,
technical protocols and format standards that permit thousands—indeed millions—
of owners of communications channels and routers to exchange traffic with each
other. Because Internet user preferences, functions, and wealth differ, some users are
willing to pay more to use the Internet than others. The owners of the hardware and
computer programs comprising the routers and communications links thus have an
incentive to engage in price discrimination—to charge what the traffic will bear. The
owner of Internet assets can determine the identity of senders and recipients of
307 Perritt, supra note 56, at 217.
308 Id. at 214.
309 Id.
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Internet traffic based on the origin and destination addresses of the Internet packets
moving through their assets. They could therefore, if they wish, set up their routing
tables according to the revenue likely to be obtainable from particular users.
The entrepreneur can program his routers to reject low-priced traffic. For ex-
ample, he can program his router exchanging traffic with end users so that traffic
destined for a high-priced provider is routed to the high-capacity communication
link connected to a particular output port, while all other traffic is routed to another
output port connected to a lower-capacity line. He can program his other router, lo-
cated further inside the cloud, similarly to route only those packets to or from high-
priced subscribers to high-capacity links and to route all others to lower-capacity
links. The result is that users, whether they are consumers or providers, get better
Internet connectivity if they pay more money, while those paying less money get
worse Internet connectivity. The same techniques can be used to discriminate against
competitors as well as to discriminate based on the price. For example, the owner
of a router may set up the routing tables so that packets addressed to a competing
service provider—say a provider of VoIP services—simply are thrown away while
packets addressed to the owner’s own VoIP service are passed along to a high-
capacity connection carrying that provider’s VoIP traffic. Because the router throws
away packets addressed to the competitor, the end user experiences an inability to
connect to any VoIP provider except that provided by the owner of the router.310
This is exactly what Madison River Communications, LLC did. Madison River
is an independent provider of telecommunications services to home subscribers,
among others, in North Carolina. It programmed its equipment, presumably rout-
ers connected to DSL subscriber lines, to block traffic destined for certain VoIP
traffic.311 It is not entirely clear from the official record made public whether Madison
River blocked all VoIP packets or only those intended for VoIP providers competing
with Madison’s own VoIP service.312 In any event, the FCC notified Madison that
it was investigating complaints about its blocking practices and in March 2005, en-
tered into a consent decree, fining Madison River $15,000 and barring it for thirty
months from “block[ing] ports used for VoIP applications or otherwise prevent[ing]
customers from using VoIP applications.”313 It does not matter whether Madison
River was programming its routers to throw away all VoIP traffic or only VoIP traf-
fic not addressed to its own VoIP servers; the point is that it was using the Internet’s
capacity to discriminate against disfavored traffic.314
Alarmed by risk of such discrimination developments, commercial entities,
including independent VoIP providers and large-volume information enterprises
310 Id. at 217–18.
311 In re Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4297 (2005).
312 Id.
313 Id. at 4297, 4299.
314 See Reconsidering Our Communications Laws: Ensuring Competition and Innovation:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 64.
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such as Google and Yahoo!, urged Congress to enact new legislation that would
ensure net neutrality. Net neutrality would disallow discrimination among con-
sumers and providers of Internet traffic, although it would allow pricing based on
the bandwidth of connections—at least price variations for bandwidth provided
consumers.315 The House of Representatives responded to their concerns. H.R.
5417316 would have amended the Clayton Act317 by adding a section prohibiting any
broadband network provider from offering its network services on discriminatory
terms and conditions, refusing to interconnect its facilities with the facilities of other
providers of broadband network services, blocking traffic associated with any lawful
content applications or services over the Internet, charging fees to avoid discrimi-
nation or blocking, and excluding hardware that does not physically damage or ma-
terially degrade other utilization of the network.318 Hearings were held by both House
and Senate committees considering this and similar legislation.319
Consumer groups testified in favor of the legislation, in part because it would en-
sure the availability of competing providers of broadband video services.320 Opponents
of the legislation argued that it was premature and inconsistent with the successful
hands-off approach to Internet regulation that had led to massive innovation and
investment in the Internet.321 While some of these opponents were willing to accept
legislation requiring studies of net neutrality, or relatively mild provisions, they op-
posed stronger provisions advocated by those most concerned about net neutrality.322
They argued, however, that going beyond those basic investigations or principles rep-
resented “an effort to safeguard against a problem that, at this point and in the foresee-
able future, is nonexistent.”323 Others argued that the FCC’s existing Internet principles,
which the Commission had incorporated into merger approvals,324 combined with
315 Perritt, supra note 56, at 218–19.
316 H.R. 5417, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
317 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–28 (2006).
318 Perritt, supra note 56, at 219 (citing H.R. 5417, 109th Cong. §3 (2d Sess. 2006) (adding
15 U.S.C. § 28 and redesignating existing § 28 as § 29)).
319 Id.; see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-541 (2006) (report of the House Committee on the
Judiciary to accompany H.R. 5417).
320 See Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006
(Part III): Hearing on S. 2686 before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 109th Cong.
13 (2006) (prepared statement of Ben Scott, Director, Free Press) [hereinafter Hearing].
321 See id. at 26 (prepared statement of Dave McCurdy, President, CEO, Elec. Indus.
Alliance).
322 Id. at 25–26 (testifying favorably about “net neutrality” study presently included in
S. 2868, and also acquiescing in net neutrality provision in H.R. 5252).
323 Id. at 30.
324 The “conditions” appendix of the FCC’s approval of the Verizon/MCI merger includes
a section entitled “Net Neutrality,” which obligated Verizon/MCI for two years after the
merger date to “conduct business in a manner that comports with the principles set forth in the
FCC’s Policy Statement, issued September 23, 2005 (FCC 05-151).” In re Verizon Commc’n
Inc. and MCI, Inc., 20 FCC Rcd. 18433, 18509 (2005). Identical language appears in the
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market forces, adequately addressed the problem.325 They argued that more prescrip-
tive legislation would discourage investment in widening the lanes on the Internet
highway to avoid traffic jams, which required investment, which in turn, required
expectations of an adequate rate of return.326
The bill reported by the Senate Commerce Committee did
not include proposed amendments to strengthen net neutrality
provisions. Chairman Ted Stevens said, “We still have a massive
disagreement over net neutrality. I still remain convinced that
net neutrality is not something that we can define. We haven’t
seen it anywhere here or in the world so far and that the World
Wide Web is still open [sic].”327 The House, on the other hand
reported H.R. 5417, with stronger net neutrality provisions.328
In the Matters of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications329 involved a chal-
lenge to Comcast’s practice of throttling peer-to-peer traffic, specifically BitTorrent,
used by its subscribers to share files. On the merits, the FCC found:
The record leaves no doubt that Comcast’s network management
practices discriminate among applications and protocols rather
than treating all equally. . . . Comcast has deployed equipment
across its networks that monitors its customers’ TCP connections
using deep packet inspection to determine how many connections
are peer-to-peer uploads. When Comcast judges that there are too
many peer-to-peer uploads in a given area, Comcast’s equipment
terminates some of those connections by sending RST packets. In
other words, Comcast determines how it will route some connec-
tions based not on their destinations but on their contents; in lay-
men’s terms, Comcast opens its customers’ mail because it wants
to deliver mail not based on the address or type of stamp on the
envelope but on the type of letter contained therein. Furthermore,
conditions appendix to the approval of the SBC/AT&T merger. In re SBC Commc’ns Inc.
and AT&T Corp., 20 FCC Rcd. 18290, 18368 (2005).
325 Hearing, supra note 320, at 11–12 (prepared statement of John Rutledge, on behalf of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce arguing that market forces are adequate and there is no need
for a net neutrality law).
326 Id. at 12.
327 S. 2686, Communications Reform Bill (Full Committee Markup): Hearing before the
S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 109th Cong. (June 28, 2006) (closing statement of
Sen. Ted Stevens, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.).
328 H.R. REP. NO. 109-541 (2006); Perritt, supra note 56, at 219.
329 23 FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008).
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Comcast’s interruption of customers’ uploads by definition inter-
feres with Internet users’ downloads since “any end-point that is
uploading has a corresponding end-point that is downloading.”
Also, because Comcast’s method, sending RST packets to both
sides of a TCP connection, is the same method computers con-
nected via TCP use to communicate with each other, a customer
has no way of knowing when Comcast (rather than its peer) ter-
minates a connection.330
The FCC found that these practices were not narrowly tailored to easing network
congestion and that Comcast had other, nondiscriminatory, methods for managing
network congestion.331
Because Comcast did not establish that the challenged procedures were reason-
able network management practices,
Comcast’s interference with peer-to-peer protocols . . .
contravene[s] the federal policy of “promot[ing] the continued
development of the Internet” because that interference impedes
consumers from “run[ning] applications . . . of their choice,”
rather than those favored by Comcast, and that interference limits
consumers’ ability to “access the lawful Internet content of their
choice,” including the video programming made available by
vendors like Vuze. Comcast’s selective interference also appears
to discourage the “development of technologies”—such as peer-
to-peer technologies—that “maximize user control over what
information is received by individuals . . . who use the Internet”
because that interference (again) impedes consumers from
“run[ning] applications . . . of their choice,” rather than those
favored by Comcast.332
The Commission responded to Comcast’s challenge “that the Commission can-
not exercise jurisdiction over its interference with peer-to-peer TCP connections . . .
because such authority must be ‘ancillary to something, but here it is not clear what
that something might be’”333 by pointing to sections 1 (goal of making communi-
cations service available), 201 (common carrier practices must be just and reason-
able), 706 (deployment of advanced telecommunications services), 256 (promotion
of non-discriminatory access to public telecommunications networks), 257 (elimi-
nation of market-entry barriers for entrepreneurs and small businesses), and 601
330 Id. at 13050–51 (footnotes omitted).
331 Id. at 13056–58 (footnotes omitted).
332 Id. at 13052 (footnotes omitted).
333 Id. at 13035.
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(assuring that cable providers offer widest possible diversity of services) of the
Telecommunications Act.334
In Comcast Corp. v. FCC,335 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in-
validated the FCC’s Comcast order. Noting that the FCC had found “that cable
Internet service is neither a ‘telecommunications service’ covered by Title II of
the Communications Act nor a ‘cable service’ covered by Title VI,”336 the court
found that the Commission lacked ancillary authority under section 4(i) of the
Act.337 Applying its established two-part test—that ancillary jurisdiction exists on-
ly when: “(1) the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are
reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its statutorily
mandated responsibilities,”338—it found that “[b]ecause the Commission has failed
to tie its assertion of ancillary authority over Comcast’s Internet service to any
‘statutorily mandated responsibility,’” the order was invalid.339
The court rejected the FCC’s argument that the Supreme Court recognized its
authority to “‘require cable companies to allow independent ISPs access to their
facilities’ pursuant to its ancillary authority, rather than using Title II.”340 It found
that “policy statements alone” cannot satisfy the requirement for a statutory mandate
to serve as the foundation for “ancillary jurisdiction.”341 The court rejected the
FCC’s argument that it had authority over broadband under section 706342 and un-
der section 257.343
In late 2010, the Commission responded to the D.C. Circuit by revising its net
neutrality rules prohibiting broadband Internet access providers from discriminat-
ing against or blocking traffic.344 It addressed the court of appeals’ ruling that it
lacked jurisdiction by reiterating its authority under section 706 of the Act;345 its
authority to promote competition and investment in, and to protect end users of,
voice, video, and audio services;346 its responsibilities under Title II to regulate VoIP
334 Id. at 13036–37.
335 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
336 Id. at 645 (citing In re High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 ¶ 7 (2002), aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)).
337 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006).
338 Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 646 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689
(D.C. Cir. 2005)).
339 Id. at 661 (quoting Am. Library, 406 F.3d at 692).
340 Id. at 649 (quoting Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002).
341 Id. at 654.
342 Id. at 658–59.
343 Id. at 659.
344 In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-
191, FCC 10-201 (Dec. 23, 2010).
345 Id. ¶¶ 117–23.
346 Id. ¶ 124.
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services;347 its authority under Titles III and VI of the Act to promote orderly
development of local television broadcasting and MVPD programming;348 and its
authority to protect the public interest through spectrum licensing.349
Verizon and others petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review and sought assignment
of the case to the same panel that ruled against the earlier FCC net neutrality order.
The court of appeals denied the panel-assignment request on February 2, 2011.350
The FCC also could have responded to the D.C. Circuit’s decision by reclassi-
fying Internet access as common-carriage—one of the regulatory options identified
as the National Broadband Plan.351 If the Commission were to take that approach,
it would have to reverse its earlier decisions that Internet access over cable and tele-
phone lines does not constitute “telecommunications” service. Administrative agen-
cies are entitled to change earlier decisions, but they must justify such changes in
policy consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act’s prohibition of arbitrary
and capricious decision making.352
C. Eclipse of the Public Domain for Knowledge and Art
The Internet has made it possible for artists of all kinds to reach a global pop-
ulation of potential audiences by reducing barriers to entry.353 The frontier of
innovation involves developing business models for intermediaries, and mitigating
transaction costs for licensing preexisting content. As Larry Lessig has observed,
however, “just as a free market is perverted if its property becomes feudal, so too
can a free culture be queered by extremism in the property rights that define it.”354
It was clear at the time of the Harvard Conference that the growth of the Internet
as a backbone for commerce, social interaction, and politics would involve the emer-
gence of new intermediaries.355 Twenty years later, the Internet revolution is manifested
as much by new rapidly growing Internet intermediaries who are supplanting the role
347 Id. ¶¶ 125–26.
348 Id. ¶¶ 127–32.
349 Id. ¶¶ 133–35.
350 Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1014, 2011 WL 446556 (Feb. 2, 2011) (per curiam).
351 See Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 513 (2009); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
352 See e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42
(1983) (noting that “an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply
a reasoned analysis for the change” and ultimately invalidating Department of Transportation’s
change in seatbelt rule).
353 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Business Models for Music, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 63
(2011) (arguing that new Internet technologies are facilitating access by low-budget mu-
sicians); see Perritt, supra note 56 (arguing the same for moviemakers).
354 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE & CONTROL CREATIVITY xvi (2004).
355 Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Role of Intermediaries, in BORDERS
IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
164 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
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of established institutions: Amazon at the expense of Borders, iTunes at the expense
of Tower Records, NetFlix at the expense of Blockbuster. This part of the revolution
continues and it is uncertain which new intermediation ideas will prove to be the
“next big thing,” and which brick and mortar establishments will fall victim.356
As this disruptive change in intermediation continues, the threatened enterprises
are employing a variety of measures to thwart the emergence of new Internet-based
intermediaries. As Larry Lessig said, “an environment designed to enable the new is
being transformed to protect the old.”357 Copyright enforcement is increasingly taking
the form of closing off access.
The technology-driven revolution in the popular music industry is a good ex-
ample of the threat.358 The major labels will not survive in anything like their pre-
vious forms. CDs are dead as a distribution medium. Barriers to entry have declined
dramatically as the costs of producing top-quality recordings have dropped by a
couple of orders of magnitude. Portable music players, such as smartphones, permit
consumers to listen to music all the time and this enormously increases the potential
demand for music.
“The increased competition and the demise of traditional gatekeepers signal a
sharp reduction in prices—approaching zero—for recorded music.”359 Prices for re-
corded music approaching zero also means that copyright is becoming irrelevant except
at the margins of the “new order.”360 “As prices for recorded music decline . . . to-
ward zero [with costs] . . . [t]he costs of copyright enforcement exceed the benefits.”361
The result is nearly one in which no one is willing to pay (much) for recorded music.362
“Technology makes it impossible to enforce copyright, but it does not matter, be-
cause no one would pay for music from either the originator or a pirate. A pirate can-
not construct a viable business model.”363
Increased supply and demand result in higher search costs. Musicians and their
potential fans must be able to find each other. Someone has to perform the match-
making function formerly performed by the major labels and the radio station chains.
Innovation and experimentation will increase as new kinds of intermediaries seek
the best way to connect musicians with their potential fans. A handful of these will
become the dominant gatekeepers.364
356 See Perritt, supra note 353, at 155–62 (explaining the need for intermediaries in
markets for music and arguing that new intermediaries are arising to perform the function
of institutions locked into obsolete capital).
357 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 6 (2001).
358 Perritt, supra note 353, at 65.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 66.
361 Id. at 95.
362 Id.
363 Id.
364 Id. at 66.
1166 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1115
The emerging intermediaries, necessary to perform the matchmaking function,
will not work for free.365 Even if a business model is unnecessary for the musicians
themselves, it is necessary for the intermediaries.366 Unless such a business model
emerges, the new music marketplace will be one in which hundreds of thousands of
artists making very good music go essentially unnoticed by those who would enjoy
their music.367 For viable business models to exist, entrepreneurs must creatively
monetize access to the celebrity, and also develop technologies for classifying music
to reduce consumer search costs.368 Monetization will rely less on copyright and more
on behaviorally targeted advertising and social networking.
“As with popular music, new technologies of video entertainment have opened
the gates to the marketplace for independent (‘indie’) artists and producers, eroding
the control of traditional gatekeepers.”369 “[T]echnology is causing the collapse of
boundaries separating movies, television, the Internet, and video games—the tra-
ditionally separate categories of video entertainment.”370
Digital technologies are now gradually dominating moviemaking, replacing film.
Production activities that used to be defined by a medium or channel of distribution
now easily cover several.371 “The melding of these traditionally separate categories
requires rethinking the economics, business strategies, and legal frameworks that
shape video entertainment.”372
Collapsing boundaries and reduced barriers mean a more efficient and competi-
tive industry, with a wider variety of choices for consumers. Large capital costs for
production of full-motion video works can be spread over more product lines.
Migration of artists and technologists from one industry category into others will
disrupt old ways of doing things and reduce capital requirements.373
Serialization374 may make a comeback because it can reduce the capital costs.
Moviemakers can build a fan base and a pool of potential investors with an initial,
relatively low cost pilot episode, and then build a revenue stream over time with fu-
ture episodes. When a work is serialized, “the economic value of the creative effort is
more in the characters than in the specific details of a single production. Accordingly,
the copyright battleground will shift to protection of characters and basic story
365 Id. at 175.
366 Id. at 66. The point is not that musicians do not deserve to make money; the point is
that they will make music whether or not they make money.
367 Id. at 66–67.
368 Id. at 68.
369 Perritt, supra note 56, at 108.
370 Id. at 107.
371 Id. at 108.
372 Id. at 107.
373 Id. at 108.
374 “[S]erialization has a long pedigree in popular culture, used by Charles Dickens to
bring his novels within the reach of mass audiences.” Id. at 110.
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features . . . .”375 The law will have to work harder to allow authors, such as fan-
fiction writers, to build new narratives on the work by creators of the originals.376
Crowd sourcing is another possibility for allowing larger numbers of people
to collaborate on the creation, production, distribution, marketing, and financing.
When collaboration increases, the law of joint authorship becomes more important.
Larger creative teams puts stress on default rules for apportioning ownership of
intellectual property.377
In these new, expanded markets, however, new entrants will need to license copy-
righted music, characters, storylines, or scenes that they incorporate into new movies.
This will increase the already-daunting transaction costs for licensing rights.378
New public and private law mechanisms are needed to make the market function
more efficiently, by making it easier for creators of new works to (1) find the owners
of preexisting content, and (2) overcome other barriers to obtaining licenses, such
as strategic behavior, irrational protection of entrenched bureaucracies, and obsolete,
embedded capital.379
As the technology-driven revolution continues in the entertainment industry, one
of the most dangerous threats to the sustainability of the Internet’s open character
arises: overreaching by owners of intellectual property—particularly ownership of
copyright in entertainment works.380 Rightsholders use civil subpoenas to obtain pri-
vate information about network users and then file lawsuits by the tens of thousands.
They pressure ISPs to discriminate among users of their connection services. That
pressure is what triggered the net neutrality debate. They hire contractors to extort
settlements by those they accuse of infringement. Copyright law threatens the healthy
evolution of the Internet because of expansion of copyright monopolies, abuse of
civil litigation, and legislative capture.381
1. Expansion of Copyright Monopolies
Expansion of protection for rightsholders and diminished scope for traditional




378 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cut in Tiny Pieces: Ensuring that Fragmented Ownership Does
Not Chill Creativity, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 4 (2011).
379 Id.
380 See generally LESSIG, supra note 354 (arguing that copyright law has been used to
stifle innovation); LESSIG, supra note 357 (arguing that changes in copyright and other forms
of intellectual property protection have the potential to choke off publicly held material,
which constitute an intellectual commons).
381 See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and Innovation in the Global Information
Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261 (1996) (arguing that product design can protect
against free riding better than copyright law).
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it makes it easier for established enterprises with an IP portfolio to discourage or
block new creative effort that competes with existing works. Two instances of such
expansion involve extending copyright to protect characters and plots, and extension
of the term of the copyright monopoly.
One area of expansion extends copyright protection to plots and characters.
Protection of characters and the derivative work right have been explored in recent
litigation involving fan fiction.382 Two recent cases involving fan fiction used Judge
Hand’s abstractions test to afford copyright protection to fictional characters; one
involved Holden Caulfield from Catcher in the Rye, while the second involved the
Harry Potter series.383 “In Salinger v. Colting,384 the district court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction barring publication of an unauthorized sequel to Catcher in the Rye,
finding probability of success on [a] prima-face copyright infringement [claim] and
unlikelihood of success on a fair use defense.”385 The court concluded that the Holden
Caulfield character was “distinctively delineated” in Catcher in the Rye and therefore
qualified for copyright protection.386
382 Perritt, supra note 377, at 15.
“Fan fiction” refers to a phenomenon in which persons other than the
author of a work write their own stories about characters created by the
original author, usually making no pretense that the characters are dif-
ferent. Fan fiction is an exploding genre, fueled by the ease with which
new works by unknown authors can be disseminated on the Internet.
“Mary Sue fiction” creates stories in which minor characters from
earlier works star in new works or in which entirely new characters are
inserted. “Slash fiction” takes male characters from earlier works and
puts them in gay contexts. “Real person slash fiction” takes real people
and puts them in stories involving gay relationships or encounters.
Perritt, supra note 56, at 179; see William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of User
Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1420–21 (2010) (describing the phenomenon of fan
fiction and suggesting several different varieties); see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi
Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 598–601 (2007); Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and the
Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 481–97
(2006); Aaron Schwabach, The Harry Potter Lexicon and the World of Fandom: Fan
Fiction, Outsider Works, and Copyright, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 387, 388–91 (2009); Rebecca
Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 651, 655 (1997).
383 Salinger v. Cotting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc.
v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Perritt, supra note 56, at 179 n.298.
384 641 F. Supp. 2d at 250, vacated, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that district
court erroneously presumed irreparable injury in granting preliminary injunction under
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).
385 Perritt, supra note 377, at 15.
386 641 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12 (2009)) (explaining the standard for protection of fictional characters).
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The second fan fiction case, Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books,387
involved a claim of copyright infringement by J.K. Rowling, the author of the Harry
Potter series, against the developers and publishers of a “Harry Potter Lexicon,”
which provided supplementary information on the characters and events in the
Harry Potter books.388 The district court found that the Lexicon contained “direct
quotations or paraphrases, plot details, or summaries of scenes from one or more
of the Harry Potter novels.”389 The defendant copied fictional facts invented by
Rowling, “such as the attributes of imaginary creatures and objects, the traits and
undertakings of major and minor characters, and the events surrounding them.”390
“[S]uch invented facts constitute[d] creative expression protected by copyright,”
according to the court.391
Another defacto expansion of copyright is exemplified by the rise in right-of-
publicity claims under state law.392 Many such claims should be found to be pre-
empted by the federal Copyright Act.393
The Copyright Extension Act is another example of an effort by established
rightsholders to extend their monopolies. In Eldred v. Ashcroft,394 Justice Stevens’s
dissent criticized the abandonment by the Court of its responsibility to protect the
public interest in free access to the products of artistic genius.395 Justice Breyer’s
dissent characterized the extension as making the copyright term virtually perpetual,
in violation of the constitutional requirement that it be limited, and that granting the
extended term to “heirs, estates, and corporate successors” of authors vitiated the
constitutionally required purpose of promoting “Science”—indeed it inhibited the
progress of science by interposing obstacles to access to copyrighted works.396
2. Abuse of Civil Litigation Process
As new technologies have stressed traditional business models, aggressive
litigation by traditional rightsholders has materialized, as evidenced by analysis
387 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
388 Id. at 517, 519–20.
389 Id. at 535.
390 Id. at 536.
391 Id.
392 See, e.g., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *11 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss professional football player’s right-of-
publicity claim against video game producer).
393 See Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1154–55 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding that the actor’s right-of-publicity claim against unlicensed distribution of his
performances was preempted).
394 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
395 Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
396 Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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throughout this Part. The enforcement methods used by rightsholders threatens core
Internet characteristics when rightsholders mobilize legal or economic pressure on
intermediaries such as ISPs to block traffic that facilitates infringing activities—as
defined by rightsholders, who naturally take an expansive view of what constitutes
infringement of copyright,397 and through their litigation strategies.
I have been an occasional participant in the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s
efforts to block abuse of civil process.398 The Recording Industry Association of
American (RIAA)’s litigation typically proceeded like this: The RIAA would serve
basketfuls of subpoenas on ISPs, demanding personally identifying information for
individuals linked to IP addresses that the RIAA believed to be involved in exchanging
unlicensed music files. Once it obtained the information, it transferred it to contrac-
tors who would send demand letters threatening litigation and emphasizing statutory
damages running into the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars. The contrac-
tor then would offer to settle for what it estimated was in the target’s bank account.
Most recipients, frightened, settled.399 This organized extortion has mostly survived
challenges, although grudgingly, the courts are placing limitations on it. In Lahiri v.
Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp.,400 the court of appeals affirmed an award
of $247,397.28 in attorneys’ fees and $10,808.76 in costs, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
against an attorney who represented an individual who maintained frivolous copy-
right infringement actions.401
In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Foster,402 the district court awarded attorneys’ fees
to a defendant who had been sued for alleged infringement of musical works owned
by the plaintiff occurring through her Internet account.403 The court found that:
The plaintiffs failed to allege any facts in their complaint that
would support Ms. Foster’s secondary copyright infringement
liability. The complaint is devoid of any suggestion that Ms.
Foster knew third parties were using her account to infringe the
plaintiffs’ copyrights or that she substantially participated in
any infringing activities. Also absent from the complaint is any
allegation that Ms. Foster profited from a direct infringement.
397 See supra Part II.B (discussing net neutrality).
398 See, e.g., Facebook Plaintiffs Seek to Consolidate Tracking Cookie Cases in California,
PRNEWSWIRE (Oct. 17, 2011), http://prnewswire.com/news-releases/facebook-plaintiffs
-seek-to-consolidate-tracking-cookie-cases-in-california-retain-professor-of-law-and-former
-dean-of-chicago-kent-college-of-law-henry-h-perritt-jr-as-expert-advisor-132013918.html.
399 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Music Markets and Mythologies, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 831, 833 (2010).
400 606 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2010).
401 Id. at 1218, 1223.
402 No. Civ. 04-1569-W, 2007 WL 1028532 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 6, 2007).
403 Id. at *6.
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Additionally, neither the parties’ submissions nor the Court’s
own research has revealed any case holding the mere owner of
an Internet account contributorily or vicariously liable for the
infringing activities of third persons.404
Moreover, the court questioned the good faith of the plaintiffs, finding that it
appeared that the “plaintiffs initiated the secondary infringement claims to press Ms.
Foster into settlement after they had ceased to believe that she was [the] direct or
‘primary’ infringer.”405 The evidence indicated that the defendant’s estranged husband
or her adult daughter may have been responsible for the alleged infringement.406
In a decision significant for a broad category of disputes over “theft” of protected
signals or copyrighted content, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
dismissal of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action
against a satellite television broadcaster.407 Plaintiffs alleged that the broadcaster sent
more than 100,000 letters to purchasers of satellite-signal decryption equipment,
threatening criminal prosecution and civil litigation unless the recipients paid thou-
sands of dollars to settle claims that they unlawfully intercepted and viewed encrypted
satellite television broadcasts.408 The suit claimed that the broadcasters made no at-
tempt to discern whether recipients of the demand letters were actually engaged in
illegal conduct, and telephone calls by the recipients protesting their innocence were
rebuffed with renewed demands for payment of money to settle the claims; therefore,
the pattern of sending the letters constituted extortion because they induced fear, made
unsupportable factual allegations, and misstated the law, thus constituting fraud.409
In Recording Industry Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc.,410
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court. The court avoided
constitutional challenges to the DMCA subpoena provision411 and held that § 512(h)
of the statute did not authorize subpoenas compelling an ISP to disclose information
as to which the “ISP act[s] only as a conduit for data transferred between two in-
ternet users, such as persons sending and receiving e-mail or, as in this case, sharing
P2P files.”412
Another type of abuse of process by rightsholders involves frivolous takedown
notices under the DMCA. Frivolous DMCA takedown notices can inflict serious
404 Id. at *3.
405 Id. at *4.
406 Id. at *1.
407 Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2006) (involving claims under RICO,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968).
408 Id. at 925–26, 942.
409 Id. at 939–40 (characterizing claims by plaintiffs).
410 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
411 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006).
412 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 351 F.3d at 1233.
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harm on persons denied access to e-commerce as a result.413 The DMCA provides
a remedy for such notices.414
In Design Furnishings, Inc. v. Zen Path, LLC,415 the district court preliminarily
enjoined a furniture designer from submitting DMCA takedown notices to eBay. The
defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s outdoor patio furniture infringed on her designs,
although the Copyright Office had denied defendant’s copyright application.416 The
court began with the proposition that:
The DMCA provides that “[a]ny person who knowingly materi-
ally misrepresents under this section . . . that material or activity is
infringing . . . shall be liable for any damages . . . incurred by the
alleged infringer . . . who is injured by such misrepresentation,
as the result of the service provider . . . removing or disabling ac-
cess to the material or activity claimed to be infringing . . . .”417
The court found that the defendant’s furniture was not likely entitled to copyright
protection, and found the “knowingly misrepresents” element satisfied by the defen-
dant’s failure to respond to the plaintiff’s demand that it prove its intellectual property
rights—three months before the defendant even applied for a copyright registration.418
The court found “irreparable harm,” although damages alone are usually
insufficient:
[T]he court concludes that, if defendant continues to submit
notices of copyright infringement to eBay, it is likely that eBay
would terminate listings, temporarily restrict plaintiff from selling
on one or both of its accounts, or suspend or terminate plaintiff’s
accounts. eBay’s responses to defendant’s notices would likely
deter prospective customers and adversely affect plaintiff’s
reputation and goodwill on a web site from which it generates 95
percent of its revenues. Plaintiff’s accounts’ policy violation
ratings would also likely decrease if plaintiff continues to sell the
furniture and defendant continues to submit notices to eBay. The
decrease in the policy violation ratings would also cause irrepa-
rable harm.419
413 See Michael P. Murtagh, Note, The FCC, the DMCA, and Why Takedown Notices Are
Not Enough, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 253–57 (2009).
414 See § 512 (g)(3) (explaining the counter notification mechanism).
415 No. CIV 2:10-2765 WBS GGH, 2010 WL 5418893 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2010).
416 Id. at *2.
417 Id. at *4 (quoting § 512(f)).
418 Id. at *5–6.
419 Id. at *7 (citation omitted).
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3. Legislative Capture
The likelihood of effective legislative action to redress the balance between new
creativity and the property rights of past creators is small because of legislative cap-
ture by the established interests who oppose innovation and competition. The legi-
slative process leading up to enactment of the DCMA420 reflects one of the political
realities of copyright policy making: when rightsholders were unable to persuade
Congress to enact their legislative priorities, they went to international treaty orga-
nizations, drafted treaty language that was adopted, and then returned to Congress,
saying, in effect, “You have to enact legislation; it’s the obligation of the United
States under international law.”421 The ensuing legislative process also provided an
opportunity to amend copyright law in other respects as well. The political power
of Walt Disney Company, other movie studios, and record labels makes any effort
to reform copyright law legislatively perilous.422
D. Behaviorally Targeted Advertising
Behaviorally targeted advertising offers advantages to both advertisers and
consumers. Advertisers need not pay high prices for undifferentiated access to large
numbers of potential customers through television, print, or billboard advertising.
Instead they can pay, often only if the target looks at (clicks on) the ad, for adver-
tisements targeted narrowly to persons likely to have a propensity to purchase their
products.423 Consumers see only—or mostly—advertisements aligned with their
interests. Behaviorally targeted advertising is possible only by using large stores of
information about the Internet behavior of millions of consumers.
E-commerce is well established. Early concerns about payment systems, order ful-
fillment, and trust are but distant memories. Big e-commerce sites, such as Amazon
and eBay, make it easy for small entrepreneurs to reach a global customer base.424
420 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2861 (1998).
421 I participated in discussions in the Clinton White House about how to rein in Bruce
Lehman, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Commissioner of
Patents and Copyrights, who was perceived as pursuing expansion of copyright in inter-
national negotiations.
422 See generally LESSIG, supra note 357, at 11 (describing the copyright wars as being
about basic American values, necessitating a balance between property interests and the
opportunity for creators to build on the past).
423 See Perritt, supra note 398, at 852.
424 See, e.g., Selling on Amazon, AMAZON, http://www.amazonservices.com/content/sell
-on-amazon.htm?ld=AZFSSOA#!how-it-works (explaining how to set up a presence on
amazon.com) (last visited May 1, 2012); eBay Seller Information Center, EBAY, http://pages
.ebay.com/sellerinformation/ebayforbusiness/essentials.html (explaining how to set up a
seller presence on eBay) (last visited May 1, 2012).
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E-commerce exhibits a wide variety of business models. Sellers of information
content have tried subscription models, similar to that used by cable television
services. Many others, such as portals providing indexing and pointers value, used
an advertising model like that originally employed by newspapers and television and
radio broadcasting.425 Still others charge a fee for each sale, resembling the business
model long used by brokers. Both the advertising and the data-collection models
benefit from giving content away for free.426 They are thus the most interesting for
the future of e-commerce, in an environment in which consumers are accustomed
to access without payment, fueled by the large number of providers who are willing
to volunteer their services and give away the fruits of their services, as on most
blogs in many collaborative offerings, such as Wikipedia.427
The technology of the Internet permits many of these business models to be
combined. For example, advertisements can be “clickable,” signifying that one may
not only read the advertisement, but also click on the image of the advertisement and
automatically be connected to the advertiser’s website. This possibility enables those
selling advertising to charge not only for ad placement, but also for user clicks.
Some e-mail services are free to consumers who agree to receive graphical display
ads with their email.428 Consumers also must agree to the release of personal infor-
mation that they supply with their subscription applications to the advertisers.
The central role of advertising in most business models has accelerated the use
of behaviorally targeted advertising. Providers of content and value-added features
can collect data about the behavior and interests of people who access their services,
and then sell that data. The value of such consumer transaction data is in helping
product suppliers and marketing personnel to target advertising and direct mail solic-
itation through conventional media much more narrowly. It also benefits consumers
because they are more likely to get advertisements that they are interested in, similar
to Amazon’s and Netflix’s “recommendations.” Obviously, this opportunity for sell-
ing and using data raises major personal privacy concerns.429 The controversy is likely
425 See Robert Samuelsen, The Five Business Models of E-Commerce, CLICKZ (Dec. 23,
1998), http://clickz.com/clickz/column/1718210/the-five-business-models-e-commerce.
426 See Chris Anderson, The Economics of Giving It Away, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123335678420235003.html.
427 See Wikipleadia: The Promise and Perils of Crowdsourcing Content, ECONOMIST
(Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/17911276.
428 See The Economics of Free: Nice But Tricky, ECONOMIST (July 16, 2009), http://www
.economist.com/node/14030161.
429 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Dierdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 283 (2011) (referring to the controversy over Doubleclick’s
plan to combine clickstream information with other consumer data); Samantha L. Millier,
Note, The Facebook Frontier: Responding to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet,
97 KY. L.J. 541, 545–47 (2009) (raising alarms about Facebook’s collection of data for
behaviorally targeted advertising); William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?:
Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195,
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to grow over private collection and use of personal data, although the more signifi-
cant threat is that the government will get access to the information, if it is collected.
If the law impedes private-sector use of personal data for behaviorally targeted
advertising, it will discourage one of the most promising possibilities for providing
revenue to replace that lost by over-expansive definitions, or over-aggressive en-
forcement, of intellectual property rights. On the other hand, the law should be vig-
ilant in blocking the government from spying on its citizens by easy access to the
store of personal data.
E. Cybersecurity
The Internet is a powerful tool for spying, and an appealing target for criminals,
vandals, and terrorists. How the law limits the tools and protects the targets will
have a powerful effect on the future of the Internet.
1. Police States, Cyberactivism and Embargos
The Internet makes it more difficult for totalitarian regimes to control their
populations, but it also makes it easier for them to spy on their populations. The
Arab Spring demonstrated that insurgents can use a variety of tools, many of them
depending on Internet connectivity, to communicate plans and coordinate activi-
ties to circumvent governmental efforts to crush dissent.430 But it also demonstrated
the fallacy of the belief that the Internet cannot be shut down by the government. The
regimes in Egypt, Lybia, Iran, and Syria succeeded, when political crises bloomed,
in disabling Internet connectivity within their territories.431 As intelligence agencies
get more sophisticated, they can monitor Internet trails, providing better intelligence
on the activities of dissidents. Traffic analysis, even without access to communica-
tions content, can reveal the identity of leaders, their whereabouts, and their plans.
2. Power of Traffic Analysis
Transactional data about communications, not involving access to content, enjoy
a less protected position than content in the combinations of legal controls adopted
by Congress. Less protection for such data flows from the reasoning of the Smith
1220–21 (2010) (describing collection of personal data for use in targeted advertising; sug-
gesting the activity violated the SCA).
430 See William Saletan, Springtime for Twitter: Is the Internet Driving the Revolutions
of the Arab Spring?, SLATE (July 18, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future
_tense/2011/07/springtime_for_twitter.single.html.
431 See Ido Kenan, e-Censorship and the Arab Spring, MA’ARAV EDITORIAL (Nov. 17,
2011), http://www.maarav.org.il/english/2011/11/e-censorship-and-the-arab-spring.
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case432—that little expectation of privacy for such data exists because the data are
disclosed to and used by third-party service providers. Even if that proposition is
correct for dialed telephone numbers, it is not true for the inferences that may be
drawn from large quantities of data about patterns of communication available from
modern telecommunications networks. Traffic analysis of IP packets to and from a
particular target can reveal a blueprint of the target’s human associations. It can
reveal subject matter interests through analysis of web browsing. Analysis of geo-
graphic information from cell phone connections can detail target movements,
minute-by-minute.433
Advances in technology facilitate such traffic analysis because they facilitate
acquisition of transactional data, as from IP packet headers, and they also facili-
tate machine analysis of patterns revealed by the acquired data. In many cases,
traffic analysis may actually be more valuable to law enforcement and intelligence
agencies than the content of a handful of messages. Traffic analysis may also be
more revealing about the private conduct and thoughts of a target than content.
Suppose a criminal intelligence agency acquires information about every cell
phone call made or received by a target for a period of six months. Through rela-
tively inexpensive and widely available techniques, the agency can collect infor-
mation on the date and time of every call made or received and the other telephone
number to or from which a call is attempted or established. Call-duration data is also
available. By analyzing the patterns of cell phone communication by the target, the
monitoring agency could determine, for example, that the target communicates
at least daily with a suspected drug dealer and, regularly, on a weekly basis, with
another individual in the target’s hometown. From these data the agency could infer
that the target is himself a drug dealer, or at least a drug user, and also could infer
that the individual with whom the target communicates weekly is a good friend or,
possibly, someone with whom the target has a romantic involvement.
A foreign intelligence agency might obtain data on a target, which could reveal
that the target has regular communication with a particular telephone number in Iran
and places many calls to different individuals in a geographic area with a substantial
Muslim population. From these data the foreign intelligence agency might infer that
the target is involved in raising money for an activity directed from Iran, or that the tar-
get is involved in organizing some form of collective activity related to Iran. At the very
least, these inferences might constitute sufficient probable cause to allow the agency
to obtain a judicial order for acquisition of the content of these communications.
432 See PERRITT, supra note 73, § 13.05[A] (analyzing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979)).
433 “Although acts performed in ‘public,’ especially if taken singly or in small numbers,
may not be confidential, at least arguably a right to privacy may nevertheless be invaded
through extensive or exhaustive monitoring and cataloguing of acts normally disconnected
and anonymous.” Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 772 (N.Y. 1970) (Breitel,
J., concurring).
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The overall effect is analogous to physical surveillance of the target—following
the target everywhere and identifying all the people with whom the target commu-
nicates face to face.
A newer form of traffic analysis is potentially even more useful and even more
intrusive: monitoring a target’s web browsing. Information about every URL visited
by a target is readily collectible by intercepting IP traffic to and from the target’s IP
address under a Pen/Trap order, which does not require probable cause.434 Alterna-
tively, and at far less cost, a criminal intelligence or a foreign intelligence agency
can obtain much of the same kind of information by obtaining records maintained
by search engines, such as Yahoo! and Google, which would reveal every web page
a user/target searches for. Because most web browsing involves regular resort to
search engines to find the URL for web pages of interest, data from search engines
represents a substantial subset of web browsing activity.
Analysis of this type of traffic not only reveals other people with whom a target
has communication, but is analogous to a type of physical surveillance—entirely
impracticable to effectuate—which would have someone looking over the target’s
shoulder as the target browses newspapers, magazines, or possible selections in a
bookstore. It is thus closer to revealing the target’s interests and thoughts, even if
the target never chooses to reveal these to anyone else.
Here lies the problem: the usefulness of the new kinds of traffic analysis that the
technologies of surveillance and target communication make possible is enormous.
It should not be difficult to convince legislators and judges that there is a compelling
need to engage in these newly productive types of surveillance, especially when the
surveillance can be justified as necessary for the “War on Terrorism.” But the risks
to personal liberty and personal autonomy that lie at the core of liberty, while un-
precedented, are likely to be overlooked when framed within legal concepts devel-
oped under the impact of past technologies to distinguish areas in which people have
a “reasonable expectation of privacy” from areas where they do not.
Furthermore, legislative and judicial decisions about striking the right balance
between surveillance and privacy almost always tend to assume that the government
will maintain the confidentiality of everything that it collects. In fact, experience
shows that individual government officials and agents do not necessarily respect con-
fidentiality obligations.435 The investigation of the Vice President’s office with re-
spect to disclosing the identity of CIA agent Plame, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover’s
use of wiretap conversations to undermine the credibility of Martin Luther King, the
role of FBI executive Mark Felt as Deep Throat in the Watergate controversy, FBI
leaks about an individual suspected for a time of being the Atlanta Olympics bomber,
and many other instances demonstrate that when even the most secretive government
434 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2006).
435 See generally STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION: PRESS OFFICERS
AND THEIR OFFICES 75–94 (1984) (regarding “leaks and other informal communications”).
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agencies have explosive information about individuals, the temptation to leak it
is strong.
Consider further what would be in the information pool subject to possible
leaks if widespread traffic analysis is performed, either monitoring e-mail communi-
cations and cell phone communications, or monitoring web browsing. The pattern-
matching tools are imprecise, and it is inevitable that someone engaging in perfectly
innocuous activities would occasionally come under suspicion. Heightened sus-
picion means that more data would be collected and more attention paid to it. And
minimization does not work very well in these new contexts. So communications
and web browsing associated with suspect persons or subjects would be accompa-
nied by data on other matters of a sensitive nature to the target, albeit unrelated to
national security threats or to criminal activity, obviously including sexual relation-
ships or interests that the target legitimately may not want exposed to others. The
temptation to leak these kinds of traffic would be especially strong to a leaker who
wants to injure the target, because the leaks would not jeopardize legitimate national
security or criminal intelligence.
3. Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism
The growing awareness, not only by governments but also by the general public,
of the magnitude of the threat posed by cyberterrorism will make it easier to impose
technological controls that undermine the essential features of the Internet architec-
ture and that subject everyone to more intrusive government surveillance. The cyber-
terrorism threat not only involves Internet use to organize physical terrorist acts, as
al-Qaeda has done, but it also provides a platform for effectuating attacks.436 If an
attacker could disable access to bank records or corrupt data, interfere with military
command and control systems, disable the intelligence that manages the electricity
grid, or bring down the air traffic control system, the level of resulting chaos could
exceed that resulting from a nuclear attack on a few cities and defense installations.
It is right to worry about this and to take steps to mitigate the threat.
But, too often, the terrorism experts do little beyond wringing their hands about
the limited power of governments to control the Internet. Implicitly, they yearn for
a return to the technological environment of the mid-1950s, when a cozy relation-
ship between intelligence agencies and one telephone company, one domestic tele-
graph company, and a handful of international cable carriers was all governments
needed to keep an eye on things and, occasionally, to disrupt communications tying
potential attackers together.
436 See Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyber-
terrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 57,
74 (2010).
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It is likely that focused public relations campaigns can shift public opinion to
favor more controls on the Internet and a relaxation of the legal barriers to eaves-
dropping. Not only that, but some of the boundaries that have historically restricted
some types of eavesdropping more than others—access to the content of communi-
cations, as opposed to communications transaction date—are becoming less relevant.
The enormous amount of transactional data now available that reveals location, com-
munications patterns, and web browsing histories present a new opportunity for traf-
fic pattern analysis that rivals access to content in what it reveals about individual
activities and intentions.437
CONCLUSION: APPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED: ROLE OF LAW, INNOVATION,
MARKETS, DISPUTES
The Internet’s success has validated the central features of its constitution,
embodying important ideologies that define Western society: the efficiency of
market-based competition in allocating resources, and the power of grassroots
democracy. Human rights have benefitted.438 Human rights abuses are more likely
to come to the attention of those who can do something about the violations.
Grassroots democratic movements are more possible. The individual freedom that
comes with being able to start one’s own business, perform music for the masses,
or tell stories through books or movies enjoys a new life.
Markets and democracy have been newly empowered by the Internet’s decen-
tralized architecture and its global scope. The smallest entrepreneur can specialize
in what he knows best and rely on others to perform other necessary functions,
linking all the inputs together through standardized interfaces and protocols. The
weakest voice has an enormous megaphone represented by the World Wide Web.
Competition and democratic discourse, however, have always threatened es-
tablished orders and elites. When new technologies increase, both motive and means
exist to block or divert the new technologies. This may occur through changes in the
content of the law or its enforcement mechanisms, as manifested by the efforts of
large copyright owners to broaden liability for infringement, some successful, some
not yet successful. It also may occur by economic or social pressure brought to bear
on institutions controlling key bottlenecks, as in the case of rightsholders pressuring
ISPs to throttle traffic that they perceive as facilitating infringement.
The best public policy is one that recognizes the harmful potential of new reg-
ulation of the Internet, made more likely by the asymmetry of political power favor-
ing established institutions. At the same time, legal initiatives may be appropriate
437 See supra Part II.B (discussing behaviorally targeting advertising).
438 See Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, The Second Great Transformation: Human Rights
Leapfrogging in the Era of Globalization, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 38–40 (2005) (discussing
human rights growth, generally, in the twenty-first century).
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to restrict the exercise of private power that can be as harmful as undue regulation.
Telling the difference is hard; advocates for blocking competition can always dress
up their campaigns as effort to block the exercise of private power they characterize
as harmful to the public interest.
A growing source of private power is that of proprietary empires.439 Big in-
termediaries are drawn into regulatory roles because they represent bottlenecks
where it is relatively easy to regulate the conduct of people at the edge of the
Internet. Whether and how these private regulators are subject to the constraints of
due process is an important question of Internet policy.440
Governmental regulation may be more transparent and have more features of
due process than private regulation, especially when private regulation is imple-
mented through technological measures that automatically determine a “violation”
of “rules” and automatically impose penalties such as excluding a user from
Internet resources.441
Developing new legal responses should follow the course that law usually has
taken in the Anglo-American tradition: lawmakers should not try to anticipate what
will happen in the marketplace. Rather, they should wait and see which entrepre-
neurs succeed and which fail; they should wait for consumers to decide what is the
next new thing. Then, they should wait a while longer to allow actual disputes to
emerge, disputes significant enough for the disputants to sue each other. Then, they
should allow the courts to resolve the disputes by adapting well-established legal
principles. Only when the pattern of judicial decisionmaking seems to have gone
awry should legislators intervene. This has been the course generally followed in
connection with the Internet, and it has been successful.
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